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". . . professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the 
competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being 
awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of 
the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself 
finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all 
of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing 
those which, to the best of one's judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average 
opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our 
intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there 
are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees." 
—John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money 
 
This paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects' initial responses to 16 dominance-
solvable two-person guessing games. The structure is publicly announced except for varying 
payoff parameters, to which subjects are given free access, game by game, through an interface 
that records their information searches. Varying the parameters allows strong separation of the 
behavior implied by leading decision rules and makes monitoring search a powerful tool for 
studying cognition. Many subjects' decisions and searches show clearly that they understood the 
games and sought to maximize payoffs, but had boundedly rational models of others' decisions, 
which led to systematic deviations from equilibrium. 
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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium even in predicting initial responses 
to games played without clear precedents. However, there is substantial experimental evidence 
that initial responses often deviate systematically from equilibrium, especially when the 
reasoning that leads to it is not straightforward. This evidence also suggests that a structural 
model in which some players follow certain kinds of boundedly rational decision rules, in lieu of 
equilibrium, can out-predict equilibrium in applications involving initial responses. 
Modeling initial responses more accurately promises several benefits. It can establish the 
robustness of the conclusions of equilibrium analyses in games where boundedly rational rules 
mimic equilibrium. It can challenge the conclusions of applications to games where equilibrium 
is implausible without learning, and resolve empirical puzzles by explaining the systematic 
deviations from equilibrium such games often evoke. More generally, it can yield insights into 
cognition that elucidate many other aspects of strategic behavior. A leading example is learning, 
where assumptions about cognition determine which analogies between current and previous 
games players recognize and also sharply distinguish reinforcement from beliefs-based and more 
sophisticated rules, thereby influencing implications for convergence and equilibrium selection. 
The potential for improving on equilibrium models of initial responses is vividly illustrated 
by Nagel's (1995) and Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt's (1998; "HCW") "guessing" or "beauty 
contest" experiments, inspired by Keynes' famous analogy quoted in our epigraph. In their 
games, n subjects (n = 15-18 in Nagel, n = 3 or 7 in HCW) made simultaneous guesses between 
lower and upper limits ([0, 100] in Nagel, [0, 100] or [100, 200] in HCW). The subject who 
guessed closest to a target (p = 1/2, 2/3, or 4/3 in Nagel; p = 0.7, 0.9, 1.1, or 1.3 in HCW) times 
the group average guess won a prize. There were several treatments, in each of which the targets 
and limits were identical for all players and games. The structures were publicly announced, to 
justify comparing subjects' behavior with predictions based on complete information. 
Although Nagel's and HCW's subjects played a game repeatedly, their first-round guesses 
can be viewed as initial responses if they treated their own influences on future guesses as 
negligible, which is plausible for all but HCW's 3-subject groups. With complete information, in 
all but one treatment the game is dominance-solvable in a finite (limits [100, 200]) or infinite 
(limits [0, 100]) number of rounds, with a unique equilibrium in which all players guess their 
  1lower (upper) limit when p < 1 (p > 1). As a result, equilibrium predictions depend only on 
rationality, in the decision-theoretic sense, and beliefs based on iterated knowledge of rationality. 
Yet Nagel's subjects never made equilibrium guesses initially, and HCW's rarely did so. 
Most initial guesses respected from 0 to 3 rounds of iterated dominance, in games where 3 to an 
infinite number are needed to reach equilibrium (Nagel, Figure 1; HCW, Figures 2A-H and 3A-
B). Nagel's and HCW's data resemble neither "equilibrium plus noise" nor "equilibrium taking 
noise into account" as in quantal response equilibrium ("QRE"; McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)). 
But their data do suggest that subjects' deviations from equilibrium have a coherent structure. In 
Nagel's [0,100] games, for example, the distributions of guesses have spikes that track 50p
k for k 
= 1, 2, 3 across the different targets p in her treatments (Nagel, Figure 1). Like the spectrograph 
peaks that foreshadow the existence of chemical elements, these spikes are evidence of a partly 
deterministic structure, one that is discrete and individually heterogeneous. 
Similarly structured initial responses have been found in matrix games by Stahl and Wilson 
(1994, 1995; "SW") and Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (1998, 2001; "CGCB"); in other 
kinds of normal-form games (Camerer (2003, Chapter 5); Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004; 
"CHC"); Crawford (1997, Section 4)); and in extensive-form bargaining games by Camerer, 
Johnson, Rymon, and Sen (1993, 2002; "CJ"). As in the guessing games, subjects make 
undominated decisions with high frequencies; but they rely less often on dominance for others 
(Beard and Beil (1994)), and reliance on iterated dominance seldom goes beyond three rounds. 
Subjects also make equilibrium decisions less often in games where identifying them requires 
more rounds of iterated dominance or the fixed-point logic of equilibrium (CGCB, Table II). 
These papers modeled subjects' heterogeneous responses by assuming that each subject's 
decisions follow one of several boundedly rational strategic decision rules called types. Leading 
types include L1 (Level 1), which best responds to a uniform prior over its partner's decisions; L2 
(or L3), which best responds to L1 (L2); D1 (Dominance 1), which does one round of deletion of 
dominated decisions and best responds to a uniform prior over its partner's remaining decisions; 
and D2, which does two rounds of iterated deletion and best responds to a uniform prior over the 
remaining decisions. Like an Equilibrium type that makes its equilibrium decision, Lk and Dk 
types are rational, with perfect models of the game, and general in that they are applicable to any 
game. They are usually defined, as we shall do here, to satisfy subsidiary assumptions of self-
  2interestedness and risk-neutrality. Thus Lk's or Dk's only essential departure from Equilibrium is 
in replacing its perfect model of others' decisions with a simplified, boundedly rational model.
2
Although Dk types are closer to how theorists analyze games, Lk types dominate 
applications and are usually taken as the natural specification of boundedly rational strategic 
decision rules.
3 But the evidence does not yet justify this degree of confidence, even though Lk 
types have the largest estimated frequencies in most data analyses. In the above experiments Lk 
types are weakly separated from plausible alternatives. Nagel's and HCW's games with p < 1 and 
limits [0, 100] are an extreme example, where Dk and Lk+1 guesses are perfectly confounded—
both tracking the spikes at 50p
k.
4 Further, the data analyses rest on a priori specifications of small 
numbers of possible types. This may in fact be a necessary evil in this kind of analysis; but it also 
entails a risk of specification bias that may have gone undetected in the tests that were used. As a 
result, the analyses cannot confidently rule out the possibility that the high estimated frequencies 
of L1 and L2 are proxies for (say) altruistic, spiteful, risk-averse, or confused Dk or Equilibrium 
subjects; or for other, entirely different types inadvertently omitted from the specification.
5
For these and other reasons, explained below, the structure of initial responses to games has 
not been identified as precisely or documented as convincingly as current methods allow. To 
move closer to that goal, this paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects' responses to a 
series of 16 dominance-solvable two-person guessing games. The design suppresses learning and 
repeated-game effects to justify an analysis of their behavior as initial responses to each game.  
                                                 
2Lk anchors beliefs in a uniform prior and adjusts them via thought-experiments with iterated best responses, without 
"closing the loop" as for equilibrium. Dk avoids closing the loop by invoking a uniform prior after finitely iterated 
deletion of dominated decisions. In Selten's (1998) words: "Basic concepts in game theory are often circular in the 
sense that they are based on definitions by implicit properties…. Boundedly rational strategic reasoning seems to 
avoid circular concepts. It directly results in a procedure by which a problem solution is found." 
3Camerer (2003); CHC; Crawford (2003); Crawford and Iriberri (2004); and Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004) give 
example applications. Keynes' wording in our epigraph connotes finite iteration of best responses, anchored by true 
preferences rather than uniform priors, as is natural in a beauty contest. The informal literature on deception also 
features finite iteration of best responses, anchored by truthfulness or credulity (Crawford (2003, p. 139)). Nagel 
(1995) focuses on Lk types, citing subjects' questionnaire responses (1993, pp. 14-15). Her subjects were University 
of Bonn students with little knowledge of game theory, but our reading of her questionnaires from a London School 
of Economics pilot, whose subjects were probably more sophisticated, provides support for Dk as well as Lk types. 
4Dk's guess is ([0+100p
k]/2)p ≡ 50p
k+1≡ [(0+100)/2]p
k+1 ≡ Lk+1's guess. Further, both Dk and Lk+1 can explain the 
empirical relationship between equilibrium compliance and complexity: Dk respects k+1 rounds of dominance, and 
Lk+1 respects k+1 rounds in many games, so a suitable mixture of either kind of type mimics equilibrium in games 
that are dominance-solvable in small numbers of rounds, but deviates systematically in some more complex games.
5SW (1994), for example, found large numbers of L1 and L2 subjects in an econometric analysis that did not include 
SW's (1995) Worldly type, which best responds to an estimated mixture of a noisy L1 and a noiseless Equilibrium; 
but SW's (1995) data analysis from a closely related experiment almost completely rejected L2 in favor of Worldly.  
  3Our design differs from Nagel's and HCW's in several ways. Our guessing games have only 
two players, who make simultaneous guesses. Each player has a lower and an upper limit ([100, 
500], [100, 900], [300, 500], or [300, 900]). Each player also has a target (0.5, 0.7, 1.3, or 1.5), 
and his payoff is higher, the closer his guess is to his target times his partner's guess.
6 Within this 
common structure, which is publicly announced, the targets and limits vary independently across 
players and games, with the targets sometimes both less than one, sometimes both greater than 
one, and sometimes mixed. The resulting games are asymmetric and, with complete information, 
dominance-solvable in from 3 to 52 rounds, with essentially unique equilibria determined by 
players' lower (upper) limits when the product of targets is less (greater) than one. The targets 
and limits are hidden, but subjects are allowed to search for them, game by game, through a 
computer interface.
7 Low search costs then make the structure effectively public knowledge.  
Studying two-person games allows us to focus sharply on the central game-theoretic 
problem of predicting the decisions of other players who view themselves as a non-negligible 
part of one's own environment.
8 Tracking behavior within subjects across 16 different games 
with large strategy spaces greatly enhances separation of types' implications (Table III). Varying 
the targets and limits within an intuitive structure makes it easier for subjects to understand the 
rules, so that they can focus on predicting others' guesses. It also makes it impossible for subjects 
to recall the current targets and limits from previous games, and so makes monitoring their 
searches for hidden information about them a powerful tool for studying cognition more directly. 
In our design, a subject's sequence of guesses often yields a clear strategic "fingerprint," so 
that his type can be read directly from his guesses. Of the 88 subjects in our main treatments, 43 
made guesses that comply exactly (within 0.5) with one of our type's guesses in 7-16 of the 
games (20 L1, 12 L2, 3 L3, and 8 Equilibrium; Table IX). These compliance levels are far higher 
                                                 
6Thus a player's guess determines a continuous payoff rather than whether he wins an all-or-nothing prize, as a 
function of his partner's guess rather than a group average. This eliminates his need to predict how his guess 
affects an average. Like Nagel's and HCW's games, ours limit the effects of altruism, spite, and risk aversion. 
7Subjects were not allowed to write, and the search data suggest that there was very little memorization. The 
interface, MouseLab, was developed to study individual decisions (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993, Appendix) 
and http://www.cebiz.org/mouselab.htm). CJ pioneered the use of MouseLab in games by studying backward 
induction in alternating-offers bargaining games in which subjects could look up the sizes of the "pies" in each 
period. CGCB used it to study matrix games in which subjects could look up their own and their partners' payoffs.  
8Grosskopf and Nagel (2001) report experiments with two-person guessing games in which subjects were rewarded 
for guessing closer to a target times the pair's average guess. With targets less than one, guessing the lower limit is a 
weakly dominant strategy, so their games do not fully address the issue of predicting others' decisions.   
  4than could plausibly occur by chance, given how strongly types' guesses are separated (Tables 
III-IV) and that guesses could take from 200 to 800 different rounded values in each game. 
Because our types specify precise guess sequences in a very large space, these subjects' 
guesses rule out almost any alternative interpretations. In particular, because the types "build in" 
risk-neutral, self-interested rationality and perfect models of the game, the guesses of the 35 of 
the 43 subjects who conform closely to non-Equilibrium types can be confidently attributed to 
non-equilibrium beliefs, rather than irrationality, risk aversion, altruism, spite, or confusion.
9
Our other 45 subjects' fingerprints are less clear. But for all but 12 of them, violations of 
simple dominance were comparatively rare (less than 20%, versus 40% for random guesses). 
This suggests that their behavior was coherent, even though less well described by our types. 
We study all 88 subjects' behavior in more detail via a maximum likelihood error-rate 
analysis, subject by subject. Our econometric framework follows CGCB's in most respects.
10 We 
assume that each subject's behavior is determined, with error, by a single type, which determines 
his guesses and searches in all 16 games. Our types include L1, L2, L3, D1, D2, and Equilibrium 
as defined above. To test whether any subject has a prior understanding of others' decisions that 
transcends these simple decision rules, we add CGCB's Sophisticated type, which represents the 
ideal of a rational person who can predict the distributions of other subjects' initial responses. 
Maximum likelihood type estimates based on guesses reaffirm our type identifications for 
the 43 subjects whose fingerprints are clear, and assign several additional subjects each to L1, 
L2, and Equilibrium, plus a few to D1 and Sophisticated (Table IX). To evaluate the reliability of 
these estimates, we use a new specification test that compares the likelihood of our estimated 
type, subject by subject, with the likelihoods of estimates based on 88 pseudotypes, each 
constructed from one of our subject's guesses in the 16 games. Such comparisons can detect 
whether any subjects' guesses would be better explained by an alternative decision rule omitted 
from our specification, and sometimes help to identify omitted rules. They can also detect when 
a subject's estimated type is an artifact of accidental correlations with irrelevant included types. 
Our specification analysis reaffirms a large majority of our econometric identifications of 
L1, L2, or Equilibrium subjects, but calls into question some of each plus all but one each of our 
identifications of L3, D1, or Sophisticated subjects. It indicates that the questionable L3 subjects 
                                                 
9Compare Weibull's (2004) argument that rejections of equilibrium in experiments that do not independently 
measure preferences are "usually premature". 
10CGCB's framework builds on Holt (1999), SW, Harless and Camerer (1995), Nagel (1995), and Stahl (1996). 
  5and some of the questionable Equilibrium subjects may instead be complex hybrids of L3 and/or 
Equilibrium. It also supports our a priori specification of possible types by giving no indication 
of significant numbers of SW's Worldly type or of any other type omitted from our specification. 
Information search adds another dimension to our econometric analysis.
11 Following 
CGCB, we link search to guesses by taking a procedural view of decision-making, in which a 
subject's type determines his search and guess, possibly with error. Each of our types is naturally 
associated with algorithms that process information about targets and limits into decisions. We 
use those algorithms as models of subjects' cognition, making conservative assumptions about 
how it is related to search that allow a tractable characterization of types' search implications. 
The types then provide a kind of basis for the enormous space of possible guesses and searches, 
imposing enough structure to make it meaningful to ask if they are related in a coherent way. 
Under our assumptions, our design separates types' search implications much more strongly 
than previous designs, while making them almost independent of the game. This sometimes 
allows a subject's type to be read directly from his searches, without even considering guesses 
(Appendix I); but most subjects' searches less clearly identify their type. We therefore generalize 
our error-rate analysis to re-estimate subjects' types using their searches as well as their guesses. 
Taking both search and guesses into account, 54 of our 88 subjects are reliably identified as 
one of our types, 44 of them non-Equilibrium (Table IX). The full analysis reaffirms the absence 
of significant numbers of subjects of types other than L1, L2, Equilibrium, or hybrids of L3 
and/or Equilibrium. Given our definition of Lk, these results strongly affirm subjects' rationality 
and their ability to comprehend complex games and reason about others' responses to them, 
while challenging the use of equilibrium as the principal model of their initial responses. The 
surprisingly simple structure of the part of subjects' behavior that our analysis can explain is 
consistent with previous analyses, but significantly refines and sharpens them. Its simplicity 
should help to allay the common fear that with bounded rationality, "anything can happen". 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes our experimental design. 
Section 2 derives types' implications for guesses and information search. Section 3 reports 
preliminary statistical tests and results, introduces our econometric model and uses it to estimate 
subjects' types, and discusses our specification analysis. Section 4 is the conclusion. 
                                                 
11A companion paper, Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004), will analyze subjects' search behavior in more detail, 
studying the relations between cognition, search, and decisions and comparing the cognitive difficulty of types. 
  61. Experimental Design 
To test theories of strategic behavior, an experimental design must clearly identify the 
games to which subjects are responding. This is usually done by having a "large" subject 
population repeatedly play a given stage game, with new partners each period to suppress 
repeated-game effects, and using the results to test theories of behavior in the stage game. Such 
designs allow subjects to learn the structure from experience, which reduces noise; but they also 
make it difficult to disentangle learning from cognition, because even unsophisticated learning 
often converges to equilibrium in the stage game. Our design studies cognition in its purest form 
by eliciting subjects' initial responses to 16 different games, with new partners each period and 
no feedback to suppress repeated-game effects, experimentation, and learning. This section 
describes the overall structure of our design, the games, and how they are presented to subjects. 
A. Overall structure 
All of our sessions were run either at the University of California, San Diego's (UCSD) 
Economics Experimental and Computational Laboratory (EEXCL) or the University of York's 
Centre for Experimental Economics (EXEC). In each case subjects were recruited from 
undergraduates and graduate students (Ph.D. or M.A.), with completely new subjects for each 
session. To reduce noise, we sought subjects in quantitative courses; but to avoid subjects with 
theoretical preconceptions, we excluded graduate students in economics, political science, 
cognitive science, or psychology, and we disqualified other subjects who revealed that they had 
formally studied game theory or previously participated in game experiments.
12
Table I summarizes the overall structure of our experiment, which included four Baseline 
sessions, B1-B4, with a total of 71 UCSD subjects; one Open Boxes session, OB1, with 17 
UCSD subjects; and fifteen Robot/Trained Subjects sessions, R/TS1-R/TS15, with a total of 148 
subjects in mixed treatments: 37 UCSD subjects (7 L1, 9 L2, 11 D1, and 10 Equilibrium) and 
111 York subjects (18 L1, 18 L2, 18 L3, 19 D1, 19 D2, and 19 Equilibrium).
13 All treatments 
used the same 16 games (Table II), which include eight player-symmetric pairs so that Baseline 
or OB subjects can be paired with other Baseline or OB subjects without dividing subjects into 
                                                 
12We allowed approximately four non-faculty university community members, plus a few students who had been 
briefly exposed to game theory in undergraduate courses.  
13Appendix A gives the instructions and Appendix B describes our pilot experiments and how they influenced the 
design (http://weber.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/#Guess). Mixed R/TS treatments are theoretically acceptable because R/TS 
subjects did not interact. The data exclude one L1 subject in R/TS1, because his guesses showed that he had copied 
from a nearby L2 subject. (R/TS subjects were not told whether all subjects in a session were assigned the same 
type, but he assumed this.) Comparing all neighboring subjects' guesses suggests that he was the only cheater.         
  7subgroups. The games include one perfectly symmetric pair, so that each subject plays one game 
twice, allowing a weak test of consistency of responses. All treatments presented the games in 
the same order, which was randomized ex ante, and which made their symmetries non-salient.  
We first describe the Baseline treatment and then explain how other treatments differed. In 
the Baseline, after an instruction phase and Understanding Test, groups of 13-21 subjects were 
randomly paired to play the 16 games, with new partners each period.
14 Subjects received no 
feedback during the games. They could proceed independently at their own paces, but were not 
allowed to change their guesses once confirmed. These design features suppress learning and 
repeated-game effects, to justify an analysis of behavior as initial responses to each game. 
To control subjects' preferences, they were paid for their game payoffs as follows. After the 
session each subject returned in private and was shown his own and his partners' guesses and his 
point earnings in each game. He then drew five game numbers randomly and was paid $0.04 per 
point for his payoffs in those games.
15 With possible payoffs of 0 to 300 points per game, this 
yielded payments from $0 to $60, averaging about $33. Including the $8 fee for showing up at 
least five minutes early (which almost all subjects received) or the $3 fee for showing up on 
time, this made Baseline (OB) subjects' average total earnings $41.21 ($40.68). Subjects never 
interacted directly, and their identities were kept confidential. 
The structure of the environment, except the games' targets and limits, was publicly 
announced via instructions on subjects' handouts and computer screens. The Baseline 
instructions avoided suggesting guesses or decision rules. During the session, subjects had free 
access, game by game, to their own and their partners' targets and limits via a MouseLab 
interface as described below.
16 Subjects were taught the mechanics of looking up targets and 
limits and entering guesses, but not information-search strategies. They were given ample 
opportunity for questions, and after the instructions they were required to pass an Understanding 
Test to continue. Subjects who failed were dismissed, and the remaining subjects were told that 
                                                 
14Some pairings among the 13 subjects in session B1 were repeated once, in a game unknown to them. The games 
took subjects 1-3 minutes each. Adding 1½ to 2 hours for checking in, seating, instructions, and screening yielded 
sessions of 2¼ to 2¾ hours, near our estimate of the limit of subjects' endurance for a task of this difficulty. 
15It is theoretically possible to control subjects' risk preferences using the binary lottery procedure, in which a 
subject's payoff determines his probability of winning a given monetary prize. We avoided the complexity of binary 
lotteries because risk preferences do not influence predictions based on iterated dominance or pure-strategy 
equilibrium, and results using direct payment are usually close to those using binary lotteries. 
16The possible values of the targets and limits were not revealed, to strengthen subjects' incentives to look up the 
ones they thought relevant to their guesses. Even so, free access still makes the structures public knowledge.           
  8all subjects remaining had passed.
17 Before playing the 16 games, Baseline subjects were 
required to participate in four unpaid practice rounds, after which they were publicly shown the 
frequencies of subjects' practice-round guesses in their session and told how they could use them 
to evaluate the consequences of their own practice-round guesses.
18 After playing the 16 games, 
subjects were asked to fill out a debriefing questionnaire, in which they were asked how they 
decided what information to search for and how they decided which guesses to make.    
The OB treatment is identical to the Baseline treatment except that the 16 games are 
presented with the targets and limits continually visible, in "open boxes." Its purpose is to learn 
whether subjects' guesses are affected by the need to look up the targets and limits. We find only 
insignificant differences between Baseline and OB subjects' guesses (Section 3.A), suggesting 
that subjects' decisions are not strongly affected by the need to look up payoffs. 
The R/TS treatments are identical to the Baseline treatment, except each subject is trained 
and rewarded as a specific type: L1, L2, L3, D1, D2, or Equilibrium. In addition to standard 
instructions as in the Baseline, each R/TS subject was taught how to identify his assigned type's 
guesses via programmed instruction on his screen and handout.
19 He was rewarded for game 
payoffs as in the Baseline, except that he was paired not with other subjects but with a robot 
(framed as "the computer") that followed his type's model of others: guesses uniformly 
distributed between the partner's limits for L1, or on the set of (iteratively) undominated guesses 
for D1 (D2); L1 (L2) guesses for L2 (L3); equilibrium guesses for Equilibrium.
20 The R/TS 
treatments also replace the Baseline's practice rounds, less relevant when subjects do not interact, 
with a second Understanding Test of how to identify the assigned type's guesses. Subjects were 
paid an extra $5 for passing this test, and those who failed were dismissed.
21 As in the Baseline, 
all aspects of this structure were publicly announced, except the games' targets and limits. 
                                                 
17The dismissal rates (including a few voluntary withdrawals) were 20% for Baseline subjects, 11% for OB subjects, 
and 20% for R/TS subjects of all types. Table VII gives dismissal rates for R/TS subjects by assigned type.  
18The practice rounds used two player-symmetric pairs of games, in an order that made their symmetries non-salient, 
so that the guess frequencies could be generated within each session. The variation in frequencies across sessions 
appears to have had a negligible effect on subjects' behavior in the 16 games. The games had a balanced mix of 
structures, with different targets and limits than in the 16 games to avoid implicitly suggesting guesses. 
19Equilibrium subjects, for instance, were taught each of the three main ways to identify their equilibrium guesses: 
direct checking for pure-strategy equilibrium, best-response dynamics, and iterated dominance. 
20We used realizations of random robot guesses rather than their means to minimize differences from the Baseline. 
21The average total earnings figures for UCSD R/TS L1, L2, D1, and Equilibrium subjects who finished the 
experiment were $45.22, $62.03, $51.74, and $50.93. York R/TS subjects were paid early and on-time show-up fees 
of £1 and £2, plus £2.50 for passing the second Understanding Test, but only £0.02 rather than $0.04 per point. With 
the pound averaging $1.63 during the York sessions, those fees, which seemed adequate, were roughly 70% of the 
  9The R/TS instructions differed from the Baseline in one further way. The predicted 
behavior of Lk or Dk depends on best responses to uniform beliefs on intervals. We expected 
most R/TS Lk or Dk subjects to treat such beliefs as if concentrated on their means, identifying 
best responses via certainty-equivalence. To eliminate variation across subjects that is unrelated 
to our goals, we designed our guessing games to have this certainty-equivalence property, 
without regard to players' risk preferences (Observation 2, Section 2.B). The R/TS instructions 
also encouraged Lk or Dk subjects to use certainty-equivalence to identify best responses.
22
The main purposes of the R/TS treatments are to learn to what extent Baseline subjects' 
deviations from equilibrium are due to cognitive limitations; and to learn what the information 
searches of Equilibrium and other types would be like, as a check on the model of cognition and 
search we use to analyze Baseline subjects' behavior. The R/TS results generally validate our 
simple model of cognition and information search (Section 2). Most if not all R/TS Equilibrium 
subjects can reliably identify equilibrium guesses, but there are significant, sometimes surprising 
differences in the apparent cognitive difficulty of our types: Lk types appear to be far less 
difficult than Equilibrium, and Equilibrium may be less difficult than Dk types (Section 3.B).  
B. Two-person guessing games 
In our guessing games, two players, i and j, make simultaneous guesses, x
i and x
j. We use i 
for the generic player and j for "not i". Each player i has a lower limit, a
i, and an upper limit, b
i, 
but players are not required to guess between their limits; instead guesses outside the limits are 










































j)| for the distance between player i's adjusted guess and p
i 
times player j's adjusted guess, player i's point payoff, s
i, is given by 
 
(1)     s
i
 ≡ max{0,200 – e
i} + max{0,100 – e
i/10} 
















                                                                                                                                                             
UCSD fees. York R/TS L1, L2, L3, D1, D2, and Equilibrium subjects' average total earnings figures were £23.00, 
£29.76, £28.50, £27.08, £24.12, and £27.65. The fee for passing the second Understanding Test raises R/TS subjects' 
average earnings, relative to Baseline and OB subjects, but R/TS L1, D1, and D2 subjects' earnings were lower than 
other R/TS subjects', other things equal, because they faced uncertainty about their simulated partners' guesses. 
22The encouragement is implicit in the wording, and does not use the term certainty-equivalence (Appendix A). 
  10With or without adjustment, the point payoff function in (1) is quasiconcave in player i's 




23 The relationship between a player's guesses and his point payoff is not one-to-one, 
because all guesses that lead to the same adjusted guess yield the same outcome. We deal with 
this ambiguity by using a player's adjusted guess as a proxy for all guesses that yield that 
adjusted guess, describing a prediction as essentially unique if it implies a unique adjusted guess. 
This ambiguity could be eliminated by requiring players to guess between their limits. We 
do not do so because automatic adjustment enhances the separation of types' search implications. 
With quasiconcave payoffs, a subject can enter his ideal guess, the guess that would be optimal 
given his beliefs, ignoring his limits, and know without checking his own limits that his adjusted 
guess will be optimal. (Our instructions explain this, and most subjects' behaviors showed that 
they understood it.) In our design L1's ideal guess depends only on its own target and its partner's 
limits, while Equilibrium's depends on both players' targets and a combination of its own and its 
partner's lower or upper limits, and our other types' all depend on both players' targets and limits. 
Thus, by contrast with CGCB's and other designs, where L1's decisions almost inevitably depend 
only on own payoff parameters, L1's search implications are sharply separated both from our 
other types' implications and from those of a solipsistic type that assumes that only its own 
parameters are relevant. (We find a great deal of evidence of L1, but none of solipsism.) 
Because our design suppresses learning and repeated-game effects and makes the structures 
of our guessing games effectively public knowledge, our data analysis will treat them as 
independent games of complete information. Players' guesses are in equilibrium if each player's 
guess maximizes his expected payoff, given the other player's. A player's guess dominates (is 
dominated by) another of his guesses if it yields a strictly higher (lower) payoff for each of the 
other player's possible guesses. A player's guess is iteratively undominated if it survives iterated 
elimination of dominated guesses. A round of iterated dominance eliminates all dominated 
guesses for both players. A game is dominance-solvable (in k rounds) if each player has a unique 
iteratively undominated adjusted guess (identifiable in k rounds of iterated dominance). Those 
iteratively undominated adjusted guesses are players' unique equilibrium adjusted guesses. 
                                                 
23It is not concave in player i's guess because the weight on e
i in the second term is smaller in absolute value than in 
the first term; this strengthens payoff incentives near i's best response while keeping them positive elsewhere despite 
a lower bound of 0 on a game's payoff. In exceptional cases like game α4β1 (Table II), it is theoretically possible for 
a player to guess more than 1000 units from his target times the other's guess, in the flat part of his payoff function. 
  11In deriving types' implications, we assume that each player maximizes the expected utility 
of his total money payment from the 16 games. Because his total payment is proportional to his 
point payoffs in five randomly chosen games, a first-order stochastic dominance argument shows 
that when guesses have known consequences, such a player maximizes his point payoff in any 
given game. When guesses have uncertain consequences, risk preferences are potentially 
relevant.
24 But Observation 1 below shows that our games have essentially unique equilibria in 
pure strategies, so risk preferences do not affect Equilibrium guesses. And Observation 2 shows 
that best responses to uniform beliefs are certainty-equivalent, so risk preferences do not affect 
L1, D1, or D2 guesses, or the best responses that define L2 or L3 guesses. This leaves 
Sophisticated guesses, which are normally best responses to non-uniform beliefs, and so are not 
covered by Observation 2. In characterizing them we assume players are risk-neutral, and thus 
maximize their expected point payoffs, game by game. Given this, each of our types maximizes 
its expected point payoff, game by game, given some beliefs; and each implies an essentially 
unique, pure guess in each game, except Sophisticated, for which this is generically true. 
We now establish Observations 1 and 2. To avoid trivialities, we assume that all limits and 
targets are strictly positive, as in our design. 
Observation 1: Unless p
ip
j
 = 1, each guessing game in the above class has an essentially unique 
equilibrium, in pure strategies. If p
ip
j





























































Observation 1 shows that unless p
ip
j  = 1, which is never true in our design, each game in 
the class from which our guessing games are drawn has an essentially unique equilibrium, in 
pure strategies, determined (not always directly) by players' lower limits when the product of 
their targets is less than one, or their upper limits when the product is greater than one.
25 This is 
true without regard to risk preferences or dominance-solvability, although not all games in this 
class are dominance-solvable because there is no dominance for extreme parameter values. The 
                                                 
24Recall that our games do not have the binary lottery, winner-take-all structure of Nagel's and HCW's games. 
25In game γ2β4 (Table II), for instance, the product of targets is 1.05, so equilibrium is determined by the upper 
limits. The γ2 player's equilibrium guess is at his upper limit, 500, but the β4 player's equilibrium guess is at 750, 
below his upper limit, 900. Moving some equilibrium guesses away from the boundaries allows clearer inferences. 
  12proof is straightforward. If p
ip
j  < 1, say, iterating best responses drives players' adjusted guesses 
down until one player's hits his lower limit and the other's is at or above his own lower limit. 
The discontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence when p
ip
j
 = 1 sharply separates 
Equilibrium guesses from other types': Games such as δ2β3 and γ2β4 (Table II) differ mainly in 
whether pipj is slightly below or above one; equilibrium responds strongly to this difference but 
boundedly rational rules, whose guesses vary continuously with the targets, all but ignore it. 
Observation 2: Suppose a guessing game's point payoff function is a symmetric, continuous, 
almost everywhere differentiable function s(x-pz) that is weakly decreasing in |x- pz|, where x is a 
player's guess; p is his target; and z, his partner's guess, is a random variable uniformly 
distributed on an interval [a,b]. Then for any player with a continuous, almost everywhere 
differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(·) that values only money (risk-
neutral, risk-averse, or risk-loving), his expected-utility maximizing choice of x is x* = pEz = 
p(a+b)/2, and his expected-utility maximizing choice of x s.t. x є [c,d] is R(c,d; p(a+b)/2).  
Proof: We show that x* = p(a+b)/2 solves  (ignoring the positive factor 
[1/(b-a)]). The integral in the maximand is differentiable because u(s(x - pz)) is continuous. Its 
derivative with respect to x, evaluated at x*, is (ignoring points of nondifferentiability) 
∫ −
b
a x dz pz x s u )) ( ( max
(2)     ∫ ∫ +
+




a dz pz x s pz x s u dz pz x s pz x s u
2 / ) (
2 / ) (
, 0 ) * ( ' )) * ( ( ' ) * ( ' )) * ( ( '
where the equality holds for x* = p(a+b)/2 by symmetry. Because u(·) is increasing and s(·) is 
weakly decreasing in |x - pz|, raising x above x* lowers the derivative below 0, and lowering x 
below x* raises it above 0; thus, the integral in the maximand is quasiconcave in x. Because x* = 
p(a+b)/2 satisfies the first-order condition for maximizing the integral, x* is optimal ignoring the 
constraint x ε [c,d] and R(c,d; p(a+b)/2) is optimal respecting the constraint.                       □     
Observation 2 shows that for a class of two-person guessing games including ours, for any 
player with a continuous, almost everywhere differentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function that is self-interested and values only money, best responses to uniform beliefs on an 
interval like those in the definitions of types L1, D1, and D2, and, indirectly, of L2 and L3, equal 
the player's target times the midpoint of the interval, adjusted if necessary to lie within his limits. 
This result is independent of risk preferences, but it depends on symmetry and uniform beliefs. 
  13We chose our games' limits and targets to make the design as informative as possible, given 
the need for a balanced mix of parameter values and strategic structures with no obvious 
correlations across games or players. In each game, each player's lower and upper limits are 
either [100, 500], [100, 900], [300, 500], or [300, 900], and each player's target is 0.5, 0.7, 1.3, or 
1.5. We identify a player's combination of lower and upper limits by a Greek letter: α for [100, 
500]; β for [100, 900]; γ for [300, 500]; or δ for [300, 900]. We identify a player's target by a 
number: 1 for 0.5; 2 for 0.7; 3 for 1.3; or 4 for 1.5. A game is identified by a combination such as 
β1γ2, in which player i has limits β for 100, 900 and target 1 for 0.5, and player j has limits γ for 
300, 500 and target 2 for 0.7. Recalling that our 16 games include eight player-symmetric pairs, 
game γ2β1 is the player-symmetric counterpart of β1γ2: β1γ2 from player j's point of view. 
Table II summarizes our 16 games, ordered to emphasize structural relationships. It also 
lists the common, randomized order in which subjects played the games; whether the targets are 
both < 1 (Low), both > 1 (High), or neither (Mixed); whether the equilibrium is determined by 
players' upper limits (High) or their lower limits (Low); the number of rounds of iterated 
dominance player i needs to identify his equilibrium guess; whether dominance is alternating 
(A), simultaneous (S), or simultaneous in the first round but then alternating (S/A); and whether 
dominance initially occurs at both of a player's limits (Yes) or not (No).
26
Table III lists the adjusted guesses implied for player i by the types L1, L2, L3, D1, D2, 
Equilibrium, and Sophisticated; and the ranges of guesses that survive 1-4 rounds of iterated 
dominance. Table IV summarizes the separation of implied guesses across types, measured as 
the number of guesses that differ by more than 0, or 25. L2 and D1 are separated much more 
strongly than in previous experiments. More generally, separation by more than 0 averages two-
thirds of the theoretical maximum for all six types (64/96) and 13/16 of the maximum excluding 
D2 and L3 (52/64), which is hard to improve upon within a simple overall structure like ours. 
The games with high numbers of rounds of iterated dominance, which result from a product 
of targets near one and limits far apart, are particularly well suited to separating types' guesses. 
The structural variations summarized in Table II stress-test our type identifications by making 
types' predicted guesses more subtle. They also play a central role in our specification analysis 
(Section 3.E), where, together with our games' large strategy spaces and the discontinuity of the 
                                                 
26Here we distinguish the numbers of rounds a game's players need to identify their own iteratively undominated 
adjusted guesses; the number of rounds in which the game is dominance-solvable is the maximum of these.    
  14equilibrium correspondence when p
ip
j
 = 1, they sometimes allow us to distinguish intentional 
behavior from "random" behavior or cognitive errors by "reverse-engineering" subjects' guesses. 
We conclude this section by using the observed frequencies of Baseline and OB subjects' 
pooled guesses, which did not differ significantly (Section 3.A), to estimate the strength of their 
incentives to make types' guesses. Table V's rows give the expected monetary earnings in dollars 
over all 16 games of a subject who made a given type's guesses, as a function of a hypothetical 
type that determines the subject's partners' guesses. The L0 column refers to a partners' type 
whose guesses are uniform random between its limits, as in L1's beliefs. The strength of an L1 
subject's incentives to make L1's guesses can be gauged by using the L0 column to compare the 
expected earnings of L1 guesses with those of other leading types. Similarly, the L1 (L2) column 
reflects L2's (L3's) beliefs; the R1 (R2) column refers to a type whose guesses are uniform 
random over guesses that survive 1 (2) rounds of iterated dominance, reflecting D1's (D2's) 
beliefs; the Equilibrium column reflects Equilibrium's beliefs; and the B+OB column refers to 
Baseline and OB subjects' actual frequencies, reflecting Sophisticated's estimated beliefs. 
Using Table V to make the suggested comparisons shows that subjects whose beliefs 
correspond to types Equilibrium, L2, and L3 have strong incentives to make their type's guesses. 
Equilibrium, for instance, would earn $46.05 against Equilibrium, $12.05 more than the next 
most profitable type in the table, L3, which would earn $34.00. Similar calculations show that 
L2's and L3's earnings would be $10.25 and $6.90 higher than the next most profitable type's. 
Our other leading types have comparatively weak incentives by this conservative measure: $1.29 
for D2, $1.22 for L1, $0.85 for D1, and $0.46 for Sophisticated.
27
C. Using MouseLab to present guessing games  
The games were displayed on subjects' screens via MouseLab. To suppress framing effects, 
a subject was called "You" and his partner was called "S/He," etc. A subject could look up a 
payoff parameter by using his mouse to move the cursor into its box and left-clicking; in Figure 
1 the subject has opened the box that gives his own ("Your") lower limit, 100. Before he could 
open another box or enter his guess, he had to close the box by right-clicking; a box could be 
closed after the cursor had been moved out of it. Thus both opening and closing a box required a 
conscious choice. Subjects were not allowed to write during the main part of the experiment.
28 A 
                                                 
27Among our types, only L1 and Equilibrium are not fairly close substitutes for Sophisticated, given its beliefs. 
28Subjects were lent calculators to facilitate the arithmetic needed to determine their guesses. It is possible 
  15subject could enter and confirm his guess by moving the cursor into the box labeled "Keyboard 
Input," clicking, typing the guess, and then moving the cursor into the box at the bottom of the 
screen and clicking. A subject could move on to the next game only after confirming his guess; 
after an intermediate screen, the cursor returned to the top-center. MouseLab automatically 
records subjects' look-up sequences, look-up durations, and guesses. 
Our design for the display reflects the fact that previous work has revealed a top-left bias in 
subjects' look-ups and a left-right bias in their transitions (CGCB). The effects of such biases can 
be transformed by reallocating parameters to boxes, but not eliminated. Our design seeks to 
minimize the ambiguity of interpretation such biases cause, by putting each player's parameters 
in a single row, putting Your parameters in the first row, and putting a player's targets between 
his limits. This makes looking up Her/His parameters, which is a hallmark of strategic thinking, 
and adjacent lower-and-upper-limit pairs that are characteristic of L1, L2, and other leading types 
less likely to occur for reasons unrelated to cognition.  
2. Types' Implications for Guesses and Information Search 
This section derives our types' implications for guesses and information search, seeking 
minimal restrictions to avoid imputing irrationality to subjects whose cognition we cannot 
directly observe. Recall that we take a procedural view of decision-making, in which a subject's 
type determines his search and guess, both with error. Under our assumptions, each of our types 
implies an essentially unique, pure adjusted guess in each game, which maximizes its expected 
payoff given beliefs based on some model of others' decisions. The leading role in the 
derivations is played by a type's ideal guesses, those that would be optimal given the type's 
beliefs, ignoring its limits. A type's ideal guess completely determines its adjusted guess in a 







type's ideal guess also determines its minimal search implications, because a subject can enter his 
ideal guess and know that his adjusted guess will be optimal without checking his own limits.  
Observation 1 for Equilibrium and Observation 2 for L1, L2, L3, D1, and D2 immediately 
yield expressions for those types' ideal guesses as functions of the game's targets and limits. We 
estimate Sophisticated's ideal guesses as risk-neutral best responses to the pooled distribution of 
Baseline and OB subjects' adjusted guesses (which did not differ significantly), game by game, 
                                                                                                                                                             
for subjects to record two parameters at a time in the memory and on the display of their calculators; but 
that is much less convenient than using the interface, and no subject appeared to use the calculator this way. 
  16rounded to the nearest integer for simplicity. Because we also rounded subjects' guesses to the 
nearest integer, and few made exact Sophisticated guesses, this does not lead to misclassification. 
  Types' search implications are derived as follows. Under standard assumptions, an 
expected-payoff maximizing player looks up all costlessly available information that can affect 
his beliefs. We therefore require that if a type's guess depends on a parameter, that parameter 
must appear at least once in the type's look-up sequence. This is uncontroversial, but of limited 
use because most subjects satisfy it by chance for most types in most games. We supplement it 
by restricting the order of look-ups. Recall that each type is naturally associated with algorithms 
that process payoff information into guesses. These require series of arithmetic operations on 
parameters; we call operations that logically precede any other operation basic. 
Subjects' searches in our pilots, our R/TS treatments, and CJ's and CGCB's experiments 
suggest that most subjects perform operations one at a time via adjacent look-ups, starting with 
basic operations, remembering their results, and otherwise relying on repeated look-ups rather 
than memory. We stylize these regularities by requiring that in each game, the basic operations 
needed to identify a type's ideal guess are represented at least once in the look-up sequence by 
adjacent look-ups, in any order, and that other operations are represented at least once by the 
associated look-ups, in any order, but possibly separated by other look-ups. These assumptions 
adapt CGCB's (Section 3.C) Occurrence and Adjacency assumptions in ways appropriate to 
current design. We stress that their motivation is empirical: In theory, a subject could scan the 
parameters in any order and rely on memory to perform his type's operations, making the order 
of look-ups useless in inferring cognition; but real subjects rarely do that. We call the look-ups 
that satisfy these search requirements for a given type the type's relevant look-ups. 
Table VI lists the expressions for our types' ideal guesses and the associated relevant look-
ups, in our notation for limits and targets and in terms of the associated box numbers (Figure 1: 1 
for a
i, 2 for p
i, 3 for b
i, 4 for a
j, 5 for p
j, 6 for b
j) in which MouseLab records subjects' look-up 
sequences in our design. Appendix H gives more detailed derivations. Basic operations are 
represented by the innermost look-ups, grouped within square brackets; these can appear in any 
order, but may not be separated by other look-ups. Other operations are represented by look-ups 
grouped within parentheses or curly brackets; these can appear in any order, and may be 
separated by other look-ups. The look-ups associated with each type's operations are shown in 
the order that seems most natural to us, if there is one. 
  173. Statistical and Econometric Analysis of Subjects' Guesses and Information Searches 
This section presents a statistical and econometric analysis of subjects' guesses and 
information searches.
29 Section 3.A reports preliminary statistical tests. Section 3.B summarizes 
the aggregate compliance of R/TS subjects' adjusted guesses with the implications of their 
assigned types, and Section 3.C summarizes the aggregate compliance of Baseline and OB 
subjects' adjusted guesses with iterated dominance and equilibrium. Section 3.D presents a 
maximum likelihood error-rate analysis of Baseline and OB subjects' guesses. Section 3.E 
discusses our specification test and analysis. Section 3.F generalizes Section 3.D's error-rate 
analysis to use Baseline subjects' searches, along with their guesses, to estimate their types. 
A. Preliminary statistical tests 
In this section we report tests for differences in subjects' adjusted guesses across the OB 
treatment and the four sessions of the Baseline treatment. Because the tests compare data from 
independent samples with no presumption about how they differ, we use exact two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests, pairing the five Baseline and OB sessions in all possible ways and, 
for each pair, conducting the tests separately for each game. This yields 11 p-values less than 5% 
in a total of 160 tests (five sessions taken two at a time, times 16 games per session), a bit more 
than one would expect by chance (11/160 = 6.9%) but distributed evenly across sessions and 
games. Similarly, comparing the four Baseline sessions pooled with the OB session yields one p-
value less than 5% in 16 tests.
30 This suggests that subjects' guesses are not strongly affected by 
the need to look up payoff parameters, so our results should be representative of those obtained 
by standard methods. We conclude that differences across Baseline sessions or between Baseline 
and OB treatments are small enough to justify pooling the data on guesses across sessions.
31  
The tests also reveal no significant difference between Baseline and OB subjects' pooled 
guesses in the symmetric game, δ3δ3, when played third and twelfth in the sequence (see also 
                                                 
29Appendix C gives the complete data on guesses and the order, but not duration, data on look-up sequences. Figures 
2A-2P (http://weber.ucsd.edu/~vcrawfor/#Guess) graph game-by-game frequency distributions of adjusted guesses. 
30Conducting the tests this way would be justified only if subjects' guesses were independent across games and 
session pairs, which is unlikely in the first case and impossible in the second; but correcting for the dependence is 
impractical. These tests are presented only as a way to gauge the differences across sessions and treatments. We also 
found no significant evidence that subjects' guesses in practice rounds differed across the Baseline and OB sessions. 
31Nonetheless, there are hints that OB subjects made high numbers of types' exact guesses less often: OB subjects 
made up 19% of the subject pool, but only 11% of those who made 14-16 exact guesses and 7% of those who made 
10-13. Possibly our design, which makes models of others easy to express as functions of the targets and limits, 
more strongly encourages Baseline than OB subjects to substitute such models for less structured strategic thinking. 
  18Figures 2G-2H). This suggests that the effects of introspective learning without feedback are 
small enough to justify analyzing the data without considering the order of play.      
B. R/TS subjects' compliance with assigned types' guesses  
Table VII summarizes the aggregate exact compliance (within 0.5) rates of R/TS subjects' 
adjusted guesses with assigned types' guesses, along with the failure rates in the R/TS treatments' 
second, type-specific Understanding Test. Overall, compliance is highest for Lk types, next 
highest for Equilibrium, and lowest for Dk types. Among Lk or Dk subjects, compliance falls 
with k as one would expect, with the exception that compliance is lower for L1 than for L2 and 
L3.
32 These aggregate results mask considerable individual heterogeneity. Many R/TS subjects 
implement their assigned type's guesses perfectly or almost perfectly, while others do no better 
than random. (More detailed results will be reported in Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004).)  
The Understanding Test failure rates tell a similar story about the relative cognitive 
difficulties of our types, except that Equilibrium failure rates are much higher than D1 and D2 
failure rates. This may be due to the greater stringency of our Equilibrium Understanding Test, 
which tests comprehension of the three different ways to identify equilibrium decisions subjects 
were taught (equilibrium checking, best-response dynamics, and iterated dominance; Appendix 
A) and may therefore screen out more subjects whose compliance would be low. However, the 
compliance rates, ranging from 55.6% to 70.3% for Equilibrium and Dk subjects, which are high 
for exact compliance, suggest that Baseline subjects' widespread failure to make Equilibrium or 
Dk guesses is not directly caused by cognitive limitations. Nonetheless, the striking differences 
in compliance and failure rates between Lk, Equilibrium, and Dk R/TS subjects are probably an 
important clue in explaining the predominance of Lk and Equilibrium over Dk Baseline subjects. 
C. Baseline and OB subjects' compliance with iterated dominance and equilibrium  
We now examine the aggregate compliance of Baseline and OB subjects' adjusted guesses 
with iterated dominance and equilibrium. Table VIII reports Baseline, OB, and pooled Baseline 
and OB subjects' compliance with 0-3 rounds of dominance, and with Equilibrium adjusted 
guesses, both overall and in the games ordered as in Table II, with random compliance as a 
benchmark.
33 Aggregate compliance with 0-3 rounds of dominance is similar for Baseline and 
                                                 
32This inversion is due, we suspect, to a curious framing effect, in which some L1 R/TS subjects try to outguess the 
computer but L2 or L3 subjects do not try to outguess their simulated partners' deterministic responses. 
33Appendix D gives the analogous results for other types. Almost all zero compliance rates for iterated dominance 
are due to logical constraints. The rates seldom differ for within 0 or 0.5, but when they do the tables give the latter. 
  19OB subjects game by game, usually far higher than random. In both treatments subjects violate 
simple dominance at a rate (100 minus compliance with 0 rounds in Table VIII) less than random 
in each of the 13 games in which it is non-vacuous, by a factor from one-sixth to two-fifths. 
Overall, subjects respect simple dominance 90% of the time, a typical rate for initial responses to 
games and much higher than random, which averages about 60% in our games. Compliance 
varies systematically across games, but there is no clear effect of structure beyond what 
determines random compliance.
34 Baseline and OB subjects' compliance with Equilibrium 
adjusted guesses are also similar game by game, also with no clear effect of structure per se. 
D. Econometric analysis of Baseline and OB subjects' guesses 
As explained in the Introduction, a large minority of our Baseline and OB subjects made 
guesses that conform so closely to one of our types that we can confidently assign the subject to 
that type by inspection, but most of our subjects' guesses are less conclusive. In this section we 
conduct a maximum likelihood error-rate analysis of all 88 Baseline and OB subjects' guesses. 
Our goals are to summarize the implications of the data in a comprehensible way, to assess the 
strength of the evidence in favor of our types, and to identify those subjects whose guesses are 
not well explained by our types and guide the search for better explanations of their behavior. 
Recall that in our model, each subject's behavior is determined, possibly with error, by a 
single type, which determines his guesses and searches in all 16 games. Our types include L1, 
L2, L3, D1, D2, and Equilibrium as defined above. These types were chosen a priori from 
general principles of strategic decision-making that have played important roles in the literature, 
with the goal of specifying a set large and diverse enough to do justice to the heterogeneity of 
subjects' behaviors but small enough to avoid overfitting.
35 We add CGCB's Sophisticated to test 
whether any of our subjects have a prior understanding of others' decisions that transcends these 
simple decision rules. In theory, Sophisticated best responds to the probability distributions of its 
                                                 
34By contrast, the number of rounds of dominance has a strong effect on equilibrium compliance in CGCB's games. 
35An ad hoc type could perfectly mimic a subject's decision history, but would have no explanatory power. It is 
hard to dispense with a priori specification because the space of possible decision rules is enormous and the leading 
rules have no simple, unifying structure; and because there are multiple rationales for any history of guesses, but we 
link guesses and search via a procedural model whose implications depend not only on what guesses a type implies, 
but why. L1 corresponds to SW's Level 1 or CGCB's Naïve, and is related to Level 1 or Step 1 in Nagel, Stahl, HCW, 
and CHC. L2 (L3) corresponds to CGCB's L2 (L3), and is related to L2 (L3) in SW, Nagel, Stahl, HCW, and CHC. 
Earlier work suggests that higher-order Lk and Dk types are empirically unimportant, and there is no evidence of 
them in our data. We also omit 3 types CGCB allowed but found empirically unimportant: Pessimistic (maximin), 
Optimistic (maximax), and Altruistic. Pessimistic and Optimistic do not distinguish among guesses in our games; 
and we judged the effects of own guesses on others' payoffs too weak and non-salient for Altruistic to be plausible. 
  20partners' decisions; but those distributions are part of a behavioral game theory that is not yet 
fully developed. We therefore operationalize Sophisticated using the best available predictions of 
the distributions in our setting: the population frequencies of our own subjects' guesses. 
Index types k = 1,…,K and games g = 1,…,G. In game g, denote subject i's lower and upper 
limits   and  , his unadjusted and adjusted guess   and  , 
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We analyze the data subject by subject.
36 Interpreting a pattern of deviations from types' 
guesses requires an error structure. We assume that, conditional on a subject's type, his errors are 
independent across games. Because our subjects so often made types' exact guesses, we use a 
simple "spike-logit" error structure in which, in each game, a subject has a given probability of 
making his type's guess exactly and otherwise makes guesses that follow a logistic distribution 
over the rest of the interval between his limits. Thus in game g a type-k subject makes a guess 
that leads to type k's adjusted guess   within 0.5 with probability 1 - ε; but with probability 
k
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37
In describing how payoffs affect the error density , we assume for simplicity 
that subjects are risk-neutral. Let y and  be subject i's partner's adjusted guess and 
i's own expected monetary payoff in game g, given y and i's own adjusted guess . Let the 
density  represent the beliefs about y implicit in type k.
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38 Subject i's expected payoff in 
game g for type k's beliefs can then be written:  
 
















                                                 
36CGCB (2001) used an aggregate mixture model that imposed stronger restrictions on subjects' type distributions, 
and studied cognition at the individual level by conditioning on individual histories. CGCB (1998) estimated subject 
by subject using the same dataset, with similar results. We believe that estimating subject by subject is better suited 
to studying cognition, given subjects' heterogeneous behavior, and more robust to misspecification.  
37Because the error rate, precision, and type are estimated jointly for each subject, there is no need to allow 
the error rate and precision to depend on type.  





is paid. All of our types can be viewed as best responding to some beliefs about their partner's guesses.   
39In our design entered guesses are restricted to the interval [0, 1000], which includes all possible limits. 
  21Let  , the set of subject i's possible adjusted guesses in 
game g that are within 0.5 of type k's adjusted guess  , and let  , the 
complement of    relative to  . The density   then satisfies:  
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The precision λ is inversely related to the dispersion of a subject's erroneous guesses: 
As ∞ → λ  they approach a noiseless best response to his type's beliefs, and as  0 → λ  they 
approach uniform randomness between his limits, excluding exact guesses. For a given value of 
λ, the dispersion declines with the strength of payoff incentives, evaluated for the type's beliefs. 
Because unadjusted guesses that lead to the same adjusted guess yield the same payoffs, the 
error structure treats them as equivalent, and the likelihood can be expressed entirely in terms of 
a subject's adjusted guesses. For subject i, let  be the set of games g for which , 
and  be the number of games in , so that the number of games for which  is G 
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the conditional density of an adjusted guess in   is then   as in (4).
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40 Because 
errors are independent across games, the density of a sample with adjusted guesses 
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where products with no terms (if   = 0 or G) are taken to equal 1. Letting   
denote the vector of prior type probabilities, weighting by , summing over k, and taking 
logarithms yields subject i's log-likelihood: 
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40The conditional density could be allowed to extend to  , but our specification is simpler, and almost 
ik
g U
equivalent given the near-constancy of payoffs within the narrow interval of exact guesses  .    
ik
g U
  22It is clear from (6) that the maximum likelihood estimate of p sets  = 1 for the 
(generically unique) k that yields the highest , given the estimated ε and λ. The 
maximum likelihood estimate of ε can be shown from (5) to be  /G, the sample frequency with 
which subject i's adjusted guesses fall in  . The maximum likelihood estimate of λ is the 
standard logit precision, restricted to guesses in  . 
k p
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The maximum likelihood estimate of subject i's type maximizes the logarithm of (5) over k, 
given the estimated ε and λ. When   is between 0 and G, the maximand is: 
ik n
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When   = 0 or G, after setting the products with no terms in (5) equal to 1, the maximand 
reduces to the sum over g on the right-hand side of (7). 
ik n
The likelihood takes the separation of types' guesses across games into account, favoring a 
type only to the extent that it explains a subject's guesses better than other types. It treats a guess 
as stronger evidence for a type the closer it is to the type's guess, because the payoff function is 
quasiconcave and the logit term increases with payoff; and it treats a guess that exactly matches a 
type's guess as the strongest possible evidence for the type, discontinuously stronger than one 
that is close but not within 0.5. If  is near 0 for only one k, that k is usually the estimated type. 
If  is nearly the same for all k, the estimated type is mainly determined by the logit term; and if 




The left-hand side of Table IX reports Baseline and OB subjects' numbers of dominated 
guesses and maximum likelihood estimates based on (7) of their types k, precisions λ, numbers 
of exact type-k guesses (which equal 16(1 – ε), where ε  is the error rate). Subjects are ordered 
by estimated type, in decreasing order of likelihood within type. These point estimates assign 43 
subjects to L1, 20 to L2, 3 to L3, 5 to D1, 14 to Equilibrium, and 3 to Sophisticated. Likelihood 
ratio tests reject the hypothesis ε ≈ 1, which approximates a standard logit model, at the 5% (1%) 
level for all but 7 (2) of our 88 subjects (110 and 213 at the 1% level, plus 109, 113, 212, 421, 
and 515 at the 5% level), so the spike in our specification is necessary.
41 The hypothesis λ = 0 is 
                                                 
41We report these tests only as a simple way to gauge the strength of the evidence provided by our data. Their 
standard justifications are unavailable, here and below, because the null hypotheses involve boundary 
parameter values. We approximated the test for ε = 1 using a non-boundary value of ε just below one. 
  23rejected at the 1% (5%) level for the 21 (34) subjects whose estimates are superscripted ** (*) in 
Table IX, so the logit model's payoff-sensitive errors significantly improve the fit over a spike-
uniform model like CGCB's for about a third of our subjects. The joint restriction ε ≈ 1 and λ = 0, 
which approximates a completely random model of guesses, is rejected at the 5% (and 1%) level 
for all but the 10 subjects whose type indicators are superscripted † in Table IX. 
E. Specification test and analysis 
For reasons explained in the Introduction, subjects' point type estimates cannot all be taken 
at face value. As in previous analyses, they might be artifacts of our a priori specification of 
possible types, which could err by either by omitting relevant types, by including empirically 
irrelevant ones, or both. We now describe a specification test that addresses these issues. 
Subject by subject, the test compares the likelihoods of our type estimate and analogous 
estimates based on 88 pseudotypes, each constructed from one of our subject's guesses over the 
16 games.
42 Such comparisons help to detect whether any subject's guesses are better explained 
by an alternative decision rule, omitted from our specification; or whether a subject's estimated 
type is an artifact of overfitting, via accidental correlations with irrelevant included types. 
First imagine that we had omitted an empirically important type, say L2. Then the 
pseudotypes of subjects now estimated to be L2 would tend to outperform the non-L2 types we 
estimated for them, and would also make approximately the same (L2) guesses. Define a cluster 
as a group of two or more subjects such that: (i) each subject's pseudotype has higher likelihood 
than the estimated type for each other subject in the group; and (ii) subjects' pseudotypes make 
"sufficiently similar" guesses.
43 Finding a cluster should lead us to diagnose an omitted type, and 
studying the common elements of its subjects' guesses may help to reveal its decision rule. 
Conversely, not finding a cluster suggests that there are no empirically important omitted types.
44  
                                                 
42We are grateful to Jerry Hausman for suggesting the idea of this test. We allow spike-logit errors for pseudotypes 
to avoid biasing the tests against them. The logit term's dependence on expected payoffs means that to define a 
pseudotype's error density we must infer beliefs, because pseudotypes do not come with built-in models of others. 
We do this as simply as possible, by assuming that the pseudotypes' guesses are best responses and inferring point 
beliefs, game by game, from their subjects' guesses. For a dominated guess, or a guess at a limit that is a best 
response to multiple beliefs, we infer the beliefs that bring the pseudotype's guess closest to maximizing payoff.  
43Not requiring significantly higher likelihood in (i) avoids ruling out cluster candidates because their pseudotypes 
offer only slight improvements in fit; few of the comparisons are very close. The "sufficiently similar" in (ii) could 
be made more precise, but it is more informative to consider possible clusters on a case by case basis. Finally, 
although the logic of our definition allows overlapping but non-nested clusters, that problem does not arise here.  
44Because pseudotypes incorporate decision errors, they only approximate the omitted types we seek to identify. The 
qualification "empirically important" is necessary because there may be subjects who follow rules that differ from 
our types but are unique in our dataset. Such subjects are unlikely to repay the cost of constructing theories of their 
  24Appendix E summarizes the results of comparing the likelihoods of our estimated types 
with the likelihoods of the 88 pseudotypes. Subjects are associated with rows, ordered by type 
and likelihood as in Table IX but with types ordered alphabetically; pseudotypes are associated 
with columns; and the entries give likelihoods. Appendix F summarizes the results of the 
likelihood comparisons in part (i) of the definition of a cluster and lists the 25 subsets of 
pseudotypes and subjects who satisfy part (i).
45 There are 5 (non-overlapping) subsets in which 
subjects' guesses appear close enough to warrant checking part (ii) of the definition. The subjects 
in those subsets that we judge to be part of a cluster are identified in the left-hand side of Table 
IX by superscripts on their type identifiers corresponding to the cluster labels in Appendix F and 
below. Appendix F also collects the guesses for subjects in those five subsets from Appendix C, 
and presents them with the games' parameters and types' guesses to facilitate the analysis.  
We now discuss the similarities in subjects' guesses in each of these subsets, diagnosing 
misspecification by omitted decision rules and identifying the omitted rules when possible:  
A. Subjects 202, 310, and 417, all estimated to be Equilibrium: All made Equilibrium 
guesses in our 8 games without mixed targets, and 310 also did so in 3 of our games with mixed 
targets; there was no apparent pattern with respect to other aspects of the structures (Table II). 
202's and 417's deviations are always in the same direction, but to different guesses; all but one 
of 310's deviations in games without mixed targets was in the same direction, also to different 
guesses. This pattern of deviations is intriguing because the standard methods for identifying 
equilibrium guesses all work equally well in games with and without mixed targets.
46 We judge 
                                                                                                                                                             
behavior, and it seems difficult to test for them. Our test makes the search for omitted types manageable within the 
enormous space of possible types, while avoiding a priori restrictions and judgment calls about possible types by 
focusing on patterns of guesses like those subjects actually made. Our notion of cluster is similar in spirit to notions 
that have been proposed elsewhere, but it imposes much more structure, in a way that seems appropriate here.    
45None of the likelihood comparisons are very close, except for 210's estimated type versus 302's pseudotype. We 
also made two exceptions to part (i) of the requirement: Subject 310 is included as a potential member of cluster A 
because his guesses are close to those of others in cluster A, and subject 204 is included as a potential member of 
cluster E because its likelihood is very close to the standard and its guesses are similar to other members' guesses.  
46Only one of our 29 Equilibrium R/TS subjects came at all close to these subjects' patterns (1203 with 11 exact 
guesses, 4 of them with mixed targets), and the rest made as many exact guesses with as without mixed targets. In 
our debriefing questionnaire, subject 417 explicitly distinguishes games with mixed targets, in which, he says, "I 
usually assumed my partner chose from fairly near the center of his range, assuming it would deviate from this 
appropriately based on the difference of our multipliers (i.e., that the average of our guesses would be near the 
median of the overlapping part of our ranges)." We take this to mean that he adjusted his beliefs upward (downward) 
when his own target was lower (higher), but only half of 417's deviant guesses are consistent with this. For games 
without mixed targets, 417 gives a clear definition of equilibrium: "I made a greedy choice, always assuming my 
partner also made a greedy choice…."; there is no clue why he did not also follow this rule with mixed targets. 
Subject 202's responses are too vague to be helpful. Subject 310 says (without distinguishing games with mixed 
  25202's and 417's guesses similar enough to meet the definition of a cluster, but we are unable to 
tell how they were determined; we suspect that they were using "homemade" rules that happen to 
mimic Equilibrium in games without mixed targets. However, we exclude 310 and so 
provisionally accept his identification as Equilibrium, which fits his guesses significantly better 
than 202's and 417's pseudotypes do, despite the similarities. This cluster illustrates the potential 
empirical importance of the subtlety of the arguments needed to identify equilibrium decisions.  
B. Subjects 210 and 302, both estimated to be L3 (with Equilibrium a fairly close second 
for both): Both deviate from L3 guesses in 7 games, 6 of which have mixed targets; and 302 also 
has minor deviations in games 11 (also with mixed targets) and 14. There is no apparent pattern 
with respect to other aspects of the structures. Of the 7 common deviations, 6 are in the same 
direction, all to similar guesses. Both subjects make exactly the equilibrium guess in game 6, our 
only game without mixed targets in which Equilibrium is separated from L3. We are unable to 
tell how those subjects' guesses were determined, but we judge them similar enough to meet the 
definition of a cluster. Their decision rules appear to be hybrids of L3 and Equilibrium, perhaps 
switching from one to the other according to some cue in the structure that we cannot discern.  
C. Subjects 407, estimated to be L2; and 516, estimated to be L1: Both make L1 guesses in 
most (5 and 7, respectively) of the first 9 games played and L2 guesses in most (6 and 4) of the 
last 7. (L1 and L2 guesses are separated in all but game 9, in which both make the L1 and L2 
guess.) There is no apparent pattern in their deviations from L1 or L2 with respect to the 
structures. We judge their guesses similar enough to meet the definition of a cluster, but we do 
not believe these subjects followed an omitted hybrid type. The time pattern of deviations and 
the fact that most of their later guesses followed a more sophisticated rule suggest introspective 
learning during play, of a kind ruled out by assumption in our analysis.
47
                                                                                                                                                             
targets), "Used what would be best for me and what was best for them" and then gives the formula for the 
equilibrium adjusted guess without mixed targets. These responses amply illustrate the pitfalls of using questionnaire 
statements as a substitute for data. From now on we refer to questionnaire responses only when they are helpful. 
47Both subjects' questionnaires give fairly clear statements of L2, but no indication that they did not always follow it. 
It is interesting to compare their guesses with subject 108's, which mostly follow L2's guesses but deviate to L1's in 
games 2, 10, and 16. 108's L1 guesses are mostly late, and L2 fits his guesses significantly better than any 
pseudotype. 108's questionnaire also gives a clear statement of L2, but a vague discussion of the switches to L1. A 
few subjects give weaker evidence of introspective learning, also in the form of early-late L1 to L2 switches: 209 
makes L1 guesses in games 1 and 3 and L2 guesses in all other games but 10; 218 makes L1 guesses in games 1-3 
and L2 guesses in all other games but 4 and 10; and subjects 301, 504, 508, and 516 have similar, noisier patterns. It 
is particularly telling that 209 and 218 make L1 and then L2 guesses early and late in the symmetric games 3 and 12.         
  26D. Subjects 301 and 508, both estimated to be L1: These subject's pseudotypes are the only 
ones with higher likelihood than each other's estimated type. They have five common deviations 
from L1, always downward, though almost always to different guesses; and each subject also has 
one lone (upward) deviation.
48 The common deviations have no apparent pattern with respect to 
timing or structure. Both lone deviations seem due to forgetting to multiply by own target and 
some common deviations also seem due to forgetting or interchanging targets or limits. We 
judge these subjects' guesses to be similar enough to meet the definition of a cluster, but we are 
not fully convinced that they followed an omitted type. There is a chance that they are just 
sloppy L1 subjects whose cognitive errors for some reason occurred mostly in the same games. 
E. Subjects 204 and 313, both estimated to be D1, and 409, estimated to be L1: These 
subjects all made similar guesses, including 645s inexplicable by our types in the symmetric 
games 3 and 12 and, for 204 and 409, in asymmetric game 13. They are among the minority of 
subjects who explained their guesses clearly in their questionnaires: All stated homemade rules 
that depart from standard decision theory (and so from our types) in different ways, but which, 
properly reinterpreted, explain most of their guesses.
49 We treat them as a cluster because their 
guesses are similar, but they were plainly not following L1, D1, or any single omitted type. 
The subjects in cluster E illustrate what seems to be a widespread tendency to invent rules 
by which to process the data of our games into decisions. We find it unremarkable that these 3 
subjects' rules deviate from standard decision theory. What is remarkable is the high frequency 
with which our other subjects' rules (mostly L1, L2, or Equilibrium) do conform to standard 
decision theory, even though most of them are best responses to non-equilibrium beliefs. 
                                                 
48Curiously, 3 of subject 301's 6 deviations from L1 guesses are to equilibrium guesses (twice when they are 
separated from all other types' guesses), though there is no hint of Equilibrium in his questionnaire. 
49Subject 204 says that he first found the person whose "spread" (defined as own target times the difference between 
the partner's limits) was smaller. If his spread was smaller, he guessed the average of the range between his target 
times the partner's lower and upper limits; and if the partner's spread was smaller, he guessed the average of the 
analogous partner's range, thus without taking his own target into account, which makes no sense decision-
theoretically. In fact he adjusted the ranges according to the limits; with this adjustment the stated rule explains his 
guesses in 11/16 games. Subject 313 says that he guessed [max{aipj, ajpi} + min{bipj, bjpi}]/2 ("I multiplied my 
upper and lower limits w/ partner's target, then multiplied his upper and lower limits w/ my target. Then I chose the 
largest of the lowers and smallest of the uppers to find my new more refined range. Then I guessed the average of 
this range."). In fact he separately adjusted each term in the above formula to his own limits before averaging them 
(see especially his game 14 guess), which makes no sense decision-theoretically. With adjustment, the stated rule 
explains his guesses in 14/16 games. Subject 409 says that he guessed [max{ai, ajpi} + min{bi, bjpi}]/2 ("Basically, I 
took his/her lower limit and multiplied it by my target. If the resulting number was between my upper and lower 
limits, I kept that in mind. Otherwise I picked my lower limit. Then I took his/her upper limit and multiplied it by 
my target. Again, if the resulting number was within my range, I took it. Otherwise I picked the upper limit. Then I 
found the average of the two numbers.") The stated rule explains his guesses in 13/16 games. 
  27With regard to the overfitting part of our specification test, we assume that for a subject's 
estimated type to be credible it should perform at least as well against the pseudotypes as it 
would, on average, at random.
50 Suppose that a subject's behavior is random relative to our types 
and pseudotypes other than his own, in that their likelihoods are independent and identically 
distributed ("i.i.d."). Then for a pseudotype to have higher likelihood than our estimated type it 
must come first among our 7 types plus itself, which has probability 1/8. Thus, for a subject's 
estimated type to be credible, it should have higher likelihood than all but at most 87/8 ≈ 11 of 
the pseudotypes. Those subjects whose estimated types have lower likelihoods than 12 or more 
pseudotypes have type identifiers superscripted + in Table IX; they include 10 subjects estimated 
to be L1, 2 L2, and one Sophisticated, all with likelihoods among the lowest for their types. 
We now combine our guesses-only type estimates with the results of the specification tests 
to give a preliminary assessment of the reliability of subjects' type estimates. We say that a 
guesses-only type estimate appears reliable if: (i) it does significantly better at the 5% (or 1%, 
which yields the same result here) level than a random model of guesses within our specification; 
(ii) it has higher likelihood than all but at most a random number of pseudotypes; and (iii) it is 
not a member of any cluster.
51 By these criteria, 58 of our 88 subjects' guesses-only type 
estimates appear reliable: 27 L1, 17 L2, 11 Equilibrium, and one each L3, D1, or Sophisticated. 
These subjects' guesses-only type identifiers have no superscripts, and are in bold in Table IX. 
Despite the differences between our games and those in previous studies, this type 
classification is reasonably close to Nagel's, HCW's, CGCB's, and SW's. There are two main 
differences. First, we find more Equilibrium subjects (12.5%, focusing on identifications that 
appear reliable) than previous studies, except SW's. Second, we find no indication of significant 
numbers of types other than L1, L2, Equilibrium, and hybrids of L3 and/or Equilibrium, in 
contrast to SW's (1995) classification of many subjects as Worldly, almost to the exclusion of L2.  
Our results allow us to go beyond our specification test, which looks for unspecified 
omitted types, to reach more definite conclusions on Worldly and SW's noisy version of L2.
52 
SW's L2 is defined as a risk-neutral best response to a noisy L1, which depending on the noise 
                                                 
50This should hold even for pseudotypes associated with subjects of the same estimated type, because under the null 
hypothesis, another subject's deviations from that type should not help explain the subject's own deviations. This is 
plainly a weak test, which can be counted on to detect only the most obvious artifacts of overfitting. 
51"Appears" because this assessment is preliminary, pending our analysis of search.  
52The issue is not whether subjects' own decisions are noisy, but whether they are assumed to respond to others' 
decision noise. SW's and CHC's definition of L1 as a best response to uniform beliefs is identical to our definition.
  28parameter ranges from L0 (uniform randomness) to our noiseless L1. SW's Worldly is defined as 
a risk-neutral best response to an estimated mixture of a noisy L1 and a noiseless Equilibrium. 
By a kind of "median-voter" result, our not-everywhere-differentiable payoff function (Section 
1.B) makes it optimal to best respond to the median type in the population as if it were the only 
type.
53 It follows that Worldly does not respond to the frequency of Equilibrium when it is less 
than 0.5—as it is in all estimates that have been published—and hence that Worldly is equivalent 
to SW's noisy L2. Because our payoff function is quasiconcave, the best response that defines 
them lies between those of our noiseless L1 and L2—strictly between except for extreme values 
of the noise parameter that make Worldly and SW's L2 coincide with our L1 or L2. Yet only one 
of our 88 subjects made guesses in that range in as many as 10 games, one in 9, and 2 in 8.
54 By 
contrast, 43 made exact guesses for our noiseless L1, L2, L3, or Equilibrium in 7 or more games; 
and both their and our other subjects' guesses appear random relative to Worldly's and SW's L2's. 
A related specification issue concerns CHC's definition of Lk types as best responses to 
estimated mixtures of noiseless lower-level Lk types. This captures SW's idea of worldliness 
without making Lk's behavior depend on the noisiness of lower-level Lk types or mixing in 
Equilibrium as SW do. But because CHC's mixture parameter depends on others' behavior, 
which subjects do not observe, their definition assumes that subjects have prior understandings 
of it. CGCB (2001, Section 3.A) argued that the Sophisticated type tests for prior understandings 
more cleanly, without imposing structural restrictions or raising delicate specification issues, 
than types that depend on estimated parameters like Worldly or CHC's Lk. More evidence on this 
issue would be useful, but in our games CHC's noiseless L2 and L3 both make exactly the same 
guesses as our L2.
55 Thus, while our results argue against making Lk respond to the noisiness of 
lower-level types, they do not discriminate between CHC's mixture definition of Lk and ours. 
                                                 
53The derivative of our payoff function to the left (respectively, right) of its peak is positive (negative), and the two 
are equal in magnitude. Thus the sign of the expected derivative is determined by the median type in the distribution.   
54On average, random guesses would fall in the range in 4.14 games. The 3 subjects with 8 or 9 guesses (115, 501, 
and 506) gave no useful information in their questionnaires, but the subject with 10 (517) stated a homemade rule 
inconsistent with Worldly: "I took the midpt of my bound times his/her target, avg'd that with his/her midpt, then 
mult'd that number by my target, and finally avg'd that result with my midpt." The prevalence of OB subjects in this 
group may seem significant, but there were no OB subjects among the 5 subjects with 7 guesses in the range. 
55CHC's L2 best responds to a mixture of L0 and L1 in the proportions 1:τ, which for τ > (<) 1 puts more weight on 
L1 (L0). By the above "median-voter" result, CHC's L2 best responds to L1 alone if τ > 1, or L0 alone if τ < 1. 
They argue that τ ≈ 1.5 in most applications, in which case their L2 is confounded with our L2. Their L3, which best 
responds to a mixture of L0, L1, and L2 in proportions 1:τ:τ
2/2, is also confounded with our L2 when τ ≈ 1.5. 
  29F. Econometric analysis of Baseline subjects' guesses and information searches 
In this section we generalize Section 3.D's model of guesses to obtain an error-rate model 
of guesses and information searches, and use it to re-estimate Baseline subjects' types. The 
model follows Section 3.D's model, avoiding unnecessary differences in the treatment of guesses 
and search. Our main goals are to summarize the implications of the search data and to assess the 
extent to which monitoring search modifies the view of behavior suggested by subjects' guesses. 
The searches of our Baseline subjects whose guesses clearly identify a type, and of our 
R/TS subjects (Appendix C) generally support our theory of cognition and search (Section 2). 
The main issue in extending our econometric model of guesses to take search into account is 
measuring compliance with types' search implications. Two aspects of the data are important 
here. First, many subjects (e.g. 202 and 210) consistently start with "123456" or some variation, 
and many end with an optional "13," checking their own limits even when their type does not 
require it (e.g. 101 and 206). We do not filter out these patterns because subjects may use the 
information they yield, and the choice of how to filter would involve hidden degrees of freedom.  
Second, subjects' look-up patterns are heterogeneous in timing: Many Baseline subjects 
whose guess fingerprints are clear consistently look first at their type's relevant sequence (Table 
VI) and then either make irrelevant look-ups or stop (e.g. 108, 118, and 206). A smaller number 
consistently make irrelevant look-ups first, and look at the relevant sequence only near the end 
(e.g. 413). Still others repeat the relevant sequence over and over (e.g. 101). Thus one can 
identify three styles, "early," "late," and "often"; but the data also suggest that "often" subjects 
are almost always well described as either "early" or "late". Accordingly, we define compliance 
with a type's search implications as the density of the type's relevant look-ups in the look-up 
sequence, filtering out some idiosyncratic noise using a binary nuisance parameter called style. 
Style is assumed constant across games, and modifies type in a way that affects only search 
implications. We take each subject to have style s = e for "early" or s = l for "late". For a given 
game, subject, type, and style, we define search compliance as the density of relevant look-ups 
early or late in the sequence. If s = e, we start at the beginning and continue until we obtain a 
complete relevant sequence. If we never obtain such a sequence, compliance is 0. Otherwise 
compliance is the ratio of the length of the relevant sequence to the number of look-ups that first 
yields a complete sequence. If, for instance, the relevant sequence has length six, and the first 
complete sequence is obtained after eight look-ups, then compliance is 0.75. The definition of 
  30search compliance is identical if s = l, but starting from the end of the sequence. Compliance for 
a given type is thus a number from 0 to 1, comparable across styles, games, and subjects.
56  
To reduce the need for structural restrictions, we discretize search compliance as follows.
57 
For each game, subject, type, and style, we sort compliance into three categories: CH ≡ [0.667, 
1.00], C  ≡ [0.333, 0.667], and C M L ≡ [0, 0.333], indexed by c = H, M, L. We call compliance c 
for type k and style s type-k style-s compliance c, or just compliance c when the type and style 
are clear from the context. All products over c are taken over the values H, M, and L. 
In our model, in each game a subject's type and style determine his information search and 
guess, each with error. We assume that, given type and style, errors in search and guesses are 
independent of each other and across games. We describe the joint probability distribution of 
guesses and search by specifying compliance probabilities and guess error rates and precisions, 
given type and style.
58 Let I  be an indicator variable for style, with Is = 1 when the subject has 
style s (= e or l) and 0 otherwise. Given a subject's type and style, let  c ζ be the probability that he 
has type-k style-s compliance c in any given game, where  1 = ∑
c
c ζ ) , , ( L M H ζ ζ ζ ζ ≡ , and let . As 
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56The compliance data are in Appendix G. For D1, D2, and Sophisticated we take the relevant sequence to have 
length 6, the minimum with which one could satisfy their requirements, e.g. via "153426" for D1 with requirements 
{(4,[5,1]),(6,[5,3]),2}, or for D2 or Sophisticated with requirements {(1,[2,4]),(3,[2,6]),(4,[5,1]),(6,[5,3]),5,2}.     
57Compliance is inherently discrete, but our discretization is coarser than necessary. This is a convenient place to 
correct a typographical error in CGCB's equation (4.3), where the summation (∑) should be a product (∏).   
58A natural generalization would allow search and guess errors to be correlated for a given game and subject by 
allowing compliance-contingent error rates and precisions as in CGCB. We dispense with this for simplicity.    
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where products with no terms are taken to equal 1. Weighting by Is and  , summing over s and 
k, and taking logarithms yields subject i's log-likelihood: 
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It is clear from (8) and (9) that the maximum likelihood estimate of p sets = 1 and I
k p s = 1 
for the (generically unique) type k and style s with the highest , 
given the estimated ε, λ, and
)) , , ); ( , , ( ζ λ ε
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ζ . The maximum likelihood estimates of ε  and c ζ , conditional on 
type k and style s, can be shown from (8) to be  /G and  , the sample frequencies with 
which subject i's adjusted guesses fall in   for that k and he has compliance c for that k and s. 
The maximum likelihood estimate of





λ is again the logit precision, restricted to guesses in . 
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The maximum likelihood estimate of subject i's type k maximizes the logarithm of (8) over 
k and s, given the estimated ε and λ. When  is between 0 and G, substituting the estimated 
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where  is the log-likelihood of the guesses-only model defined in (7). Thus 
search adds an additively separable term in search compliance, minus an additional term  . 
As in Section 3.D's model, when   = 0 or G,  reduces to the sum over g in 
the second-to-last line of (10). When  or both   and  = 0 for some c (  by 
definition), the corresponding terms drop out of (8) and their analogs are eliminated from (10). 
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  32The model now has six independent parameters per subject: error rateε , precisionλ , type 
k, style s, and two independent compliance probabilities c ζ . The maximum likelihood estimates 
of ε ,  c ζ , and λ , given k and s, are  /G,  , and the standard logit precision. The 
estimates of k and s maximize the expression in (10), given the other estimates. 
ik n G m
isk
c /
Guesses influence these estimates exactly as in Section 3.D's model, and unless the 
estimated k changes the estimates of ε andλ  are the same; but now the estimated k is influenced 
by information search as well as guesses. The search term in the last line of (10) is a convex 
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more concentrated on particular levels of c, because their search implications explain more of the 
variation in search patterns. Note that such combinations are favored without regard to whether 
the levels of c on which the  are concentrated are high or low. We avoid such restrictions 
because levels of search compliance are not meaningfully comparable across types and it would 
be arbitrary to favor a type just because its compliance requirements are easier to satisfy. 
Without them, however, the likelihood may favor a type simply because compliance is 0 in many 
or all games (0 compliance is independent of style). We deal with this as simply as possible, by 




The right-hand side of Table IX reports maximum likelihood estimates of each Baseline 
subject's type and style, error rate, precision, and rates of search compliance, based first on 
search only and then on guesses and search combined. For the latter estimates we report separate 
as well as total log-likelihoods, to give a better indication of what drives the type estimates.
60
Most subjects' type estimates based on guesses and search reaffirm the guesses-only 
estimates, including those of 39 of the 46 Baseline subjects whose estimates appeared reliable 
and 51 out of all 71 Baseline subjects.
61 For some subjects, however, the guesses-and-search type 
                                                 
59The cutoff of 8 is a conservative response to the difficulty of specifying a precise model of search compliance. A 
more standard but more complex approach, in the spirit of CGCB's use of their Occurrence assumption in defining 
search compliance, would add a separate category for 0 compliance; estimate a subject's probability, given type and 
style, of having positive compliance; and require it to be sufficiently greater than 0. This would have a similar effect.   
60Ties in the search-only or guesses-and-search type-style estimates are not rare, due to our coarse categorization. 
When they occur we report the tied estimate closest to the guesses-only estimate, indicating the others in the notes. 
Most subjects' style estimates are early but there is a sizeable minority of late estimates, suggesting that without the 
style parameter, our characterization of search compliance would distort the implications of some subjects' searches. 
61This happens in part because the guess part of the log-likelihood is nearly 6 times larger than the search part, and 
so has much more weight in determining the estimates based on guesses and search. The difference in weights arises 
because our theory makes sharper predictions about guesses than about search, which are far less likely to be 
  33estimate resolves a tension between guesses-only and search-only estimates in favor of a type 
different than the guesses-only estimate.
62 In more extreme cases, a subject's guesses-only type 
estimate is excluded because it has 0 search compliance in 8 or more games. This group includes 
subject 415, estimated L1 on guesses (with 9 exact) but (noisy) D1 on guesses and search. 
Subject 415 has 9 games with 0 L1 search compliance due to no adjacent [4,6]'s or [6,4]'s (Table 
VI), but his sequences are rich in [4,2,6]'s and [6,2,4]'s and L1 search compliance across games is 
weakly correlated with L1 guesses. We therefore believe that this subject simply violated our 
assumption that basic operations are represented by adjacent look-ups (Section 2).
63   
We update Section 3.E's reliability criteria to incorporate search as follows. When the 
guesses-and-search type estimate differs from the guesses-only estimate, we favor the former but 
require it to pass the analogs of the guesses-only criteria. We say that a guesses-and-search type 
estimate is reliable if: (i) it does significantly better at the 5% (or 1%, which yields the same 
result here) level than a random model of guesses and search within our specification; (ii) the 
guesses-only part of its likelihood is higher than the guesses-only likelihood for all but at most a 
random number of pseudotypes; and (iii) it is not a member of any cluster.
64
A guesses-and-search type estimate that does sufficiently better than random in explaining 
search can satisfy the updated criterion (i) even if it does not satisfy the guesses-only criterion 
(i). In fact the only Baseline subject who does not satisfy the updated criterion (i) is 109, who 
had 0 search compliance in at least 8 games for every type. But the updated criterion (ii) is more 
stringent than the guesses-only criterion (ii), because the guesses-and-search type estimate can 
only have the same or lower likelihood for guesses than for the guesses-only type estimate. 
Criterion (ii) calls into question the type identifications of 7 subjects who satisfied the guesses-
only criterion (ii), in addition to those of the 15 subjects who didn't satisfy that criterion.   
                                                                                                                                                             
satisfied by chance. If we tried to put search on a more equal footing by making sharper predictions, e.g. requiring 
more precise levels of compliance within a finer categorization, our subjects' searches would rarely satisfy types' 
search implications, and the stronger restrictions would cause severe specification bias. 
62These subjects include 105, 113, 213, and 420, estimated as L1 based on guesses but Equilibrium, L2, or L3 based 
on guesses and search; 110, 205, 306, 403, and 414, estimated as L2 based on guesses but L1 or Equilibrium based 
on guesses and search; 302, estimated as L3 based on guesses but Equilibrium based on guesses and search; and 312 
and 313, estimated as D1 (312 noisy) based on guesses but L1 or L2 based on guesses and search. 
63This group also includes several subjects whose guesses-only type estimates we believe were rightly excluded: 
115, 204, and 401, estimated D1 based on guesses but Equilibrium or L1 on guesses and search; 112, estimated 
Equilibrium based on guesses but L2 on guesses and search; and 304 and 421, estimated Sophisticated based on 
guesses but Equilibrium or L1 on guesses and search.  
64In (ii) we include OB subjects' pseudotypes for comparability with guesses-only results, so random still means 11.     
  34Under the updated criteria, we classify 43 of our 71 Baseline subjects' guesses-and-search 
type estimates as reliable: 22 L1, 13 L2, and 8 Equilibrium. These subjects' guesses-and-search 
type identifiers have no superscripts (though some have subscripts) and are in bold in Table IX. 
The search analysis confirms the reliability of 39 of our 46 Baseline subjects whose guesses-only 
type estimates appeared reliable. It also reliably identifies 2 subjects as L1 who had appeared 
reliably identified as L2; and confirms the reliability of 1 L1 and 1 L2 subject whose guesses-
only estimates were inconclusive. Finally, it calls into question the type estimates of 4 subjects 
who had appeared reliably identified: 1 each L1 (subject 415), L2, D1, and Equilibrium. 
Adding to these Baseline subjects the 11 of 17 OB subjects whose guesses-only type 
estimates (in bold in Table IX) appeared reliable (7 L1, 1 L2, 1 L3, 2 Equilibrium, and 1 
Sophisticated), we have a total of 54 of 88 subjects whose types can be identified with 
confidence: 29 L1, 14 L2, 1 L3, 10 Equilibrium, and 1 Sophisticated.
65 Going beyond our 
criteria, one might add subject 415 as a probable L1 and the 4 subjects in clusters A and B as 
likely hybrids of L3 and/or Equilibrium. Either way, the search analysis refines and sharpens our 
conclusions, and confirms the absence of significant numbers of subjects of types other than L1, 
L2, Equilibrium, or possibly hybrids of L3 and/or Equilibrium. This suggests that it will be 
difficult to improve upon a random model of the behavior of the 29-34 unclassified subjects. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has reported an experiment that elicits subjects' initial responses to a series of 16 
two-person guessing games, monitoring their searches for hidden payoff information along with 
their guesses. Our design yields strong separation of the guesses and searches implied by leading 
decision rules (types) in a very large space of possible behaviors. Many subjects' guesses yield 
clear strategic fingerprints, so that their types can be read directly from their guesses. Other 
subjects' types can reliably be identified via an econometric and specification analysis.  
Our subject population includes significant numbers of reliably identified L1, L2, and 
Equilibrium subjects, and possibly some hybrids of L3 and/or Equilibrium. A large majority of 
these subjects follow types other than Equilibrium; and because their types build in risk-neutral, 
self-interested rationality and perfect models of the game, their systematic deviations from 
equilibrium can be confidently attributed to non-equilibrium beliefs rather than irrationality, risk 
                                                 
65Other subjects' low levels of compliance with Sophisticated's search requirements suggest that the identification of 
the 1 Sophisticated subject, who was a noisy OB subject, might not have survived monitoring search.      
  35aversion, altruism, spite, or confusion. Our results strongly affirm subjects' rationality and ability 
to comprehend complex games and reason about others' responses to them, while challenging the 
use of equilibrium as the principal model of their initial responses. The surprisingly simple 
structure of their behavior is consistent with previous analyses but refines and sharpens them, 
supporting the leading role given Lk types in applications and informal analyses. Its simplicity 
should help to allay the common fear that "anything can happen" with bounded rationality. 
A companion paper, Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004), will analyze our R/TS and 
Baseline subjects' search behavior in more detail, studying the relations between cognition, 
search, and guesses. Preliminary analysis provides support for our model of cognition and search 
and confirms that subjects find Lk types easier or more natural to implement than Equilibrium or 
Dk. This may help to explain the prevalence of Lk types in the Baseline and OB treatments.       
We close by noting that the cognitive implications of our results suggest conclusions about 
the structure of learning rules. Our subjects' comprehension of the games and tendencies toward 
exact best responses to the beliefs implied by simplified models of others point clearly away 
from reinforcement learning and toward beliefs-based models like weighted fictitious play or 
hybrids like Camerer and Ho's (1999) experience-weighted attraction learning. We plan in future 
experiments to use information search to discriminate among alternative theories of learning, 
whose search implications are often more sharply separated than their implications for decisions.
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  38Figure 1. Screen Shot of the MouseLab Display 
 
Table I. Overall Structure 
Session Date Location  Subjects 
B1 1/31/2002  UCSD  13 
B 4 UCSD  20 
B 4 U 1
B 5 UCSD  21 
O 5 UCSD  17 
R/TS1 2/1/2002  UCSD  1
R 5 UCSD  5
R 5 UCSD  8
 
 
2  /19/2002  (a.m.) 
3  /19 2002 (p.m.)  CSD  7 
4  /24/2002  (a.m.) 
B1  /24/2002  (p.m.) 
3:  4  L1, 5 L2, 4 Equilibrium 
/TS2  /20/2002  (a.m.)    Equilibrium 
/TS3  /20/2002  (p.m.)    D1 
R/TS4 5/23/2002  UCSD 11:  3  L1, 4 L2, 3 D1, 1 Equilibrium 
R/TS5 4/25/2003  York  10  L3 
R/TS6 4/30/2003  York  11:  2  L3, 9 D2 
R/TS7 5/1/2003  York  11:  3  L2, 2 L3, 1 D1, 2 D2, 3 Equilibrium 
R/TS8 5/6/2003  York  8:  3  D1, 2 D2, 3 Equilibrium 
R/TS9 5/9/2003  York  12:  1  L2, 1 L3, 3 D1, 1 D2, 6 Equilibrium 
R/TS10 5/14/2003  York  12:  2  L2, 5 D1, 1 D2, 4 Equilibrium 
R/TS11 5/21/2003  York  10:  3  L1, 4 L2, 3 D1
R/TS12 5/23/2003  York  5  L1 
R/TS13 5/28/2003  York  8:  4  L1, 4 L2 
R/TS14 5/30/2003  York  12:  3  L1, 2 L2, 2 L3, 2 D1, 3 D2 
R/TS15 6/10/2003  York  12:  3  L1, 2 L2, 1 L3, 2 D1, 1 D2, 3 Equilibrium 
 
  39Table II. Strategic Structures of the Games
Game Order Targets Equilibrium Rounds of Pattern of  Dominance at
i  j Played   Dominance Dominance
  Both ends
α2β1  6 Low Low 4 A  No
β1α2  15 Low  Low 3 A  No
β1γ2  14 Low  Low 3 A  Yes
γ2β1  10 Low  Low 2 A  No
γ4δ3  9 High High2 S  N o
δ3γ4  2 High High3 S  Y e s
δ3δ3 12 High High5 S  N o
δ3δ3 3 High High5 S  N o
β1α4  16 Mixed Low 9 S/A  No
α4β1  11 Mixed Low 10 S/A  No
δ2β3  4 Mixed Low 17 S/A  No
β3δ2  13 Mixed Low 18 S/A  No
γ2β4 8 Mixed High2 2 A  N o
β4γ2 1 Mixed High2 3 A  Y e s
α2α4  7 Mixed High5 2S / A  N o
α4α2  5 Mixed High5 1S / A  N o
Limits: α [100, 500], β [100, 900], γ [300, 500], δ [300, 900]. Targets: 1 for 0.5, 2 for 0.7, 3 for 1.3, 4 for 1.5. Patterns of 
dominance: A for Alternating; S for Simultaneous; and S/A for Simultaneous in first round, then Alternating.  
 
Table III. Types' Guesses and Guesses that Survive Iterated Dominance 
Game Player i's guess for typeR a n ge of iteratively undominated guesses
  L1 L2  L3  D1  D2  Eq. Soph. 1 round 2 rounds  3 rounds 4 rounds
α2β1  350 105 122.5 122.5  122.5 100 122 100, 500 100, 175  100, 175 100, 100
β1α2 150  175 100  150  100 100 132 100, 250 100, 250  100, 100 100, 100
β1γ2 200  175 150  200  150 150 162 150, 250 150, 250  150, 150 150, 150
γ2β1 350  300 300  300  300 300 300 300, 500 300, 300  300, 300 300, 300
γ4δ3 500  500 500  500  500 500 500 450, 500 500, 500  500, 500 500, 500
δ3γ4 520  650 650 617.5  650 650 650 390, 650 585, 650  650, 650 650, 650
δ3δ3 780  900 900 838.5  900 900 900 390, 900 507, 900  659.1, 900 856.8, 900
δ3δ3 780  900 900 838.5  900 900 900 390, 900 507, 900  659.1, 900 856.8, 900
β1α4  150 250 112.5 162.5 131.25 100 187 100, 250 100, 250  100, 187.5 100, 187.5
α4β1 500  225 375 262.5 262.5 150 300 150, 500 150, 375  150, 375 150, 281.27
δ2β3  350 546 318.5 451.5 423.15 300 420 300, 630 300, 630  300, 573.3 300, 573.3
β3δ2  780 455 709.8 604.5  604.5 390 695 390, 900 390, 819  390, 819 390, 745.29
γ2β4 350  420  367.5 420  420 500 420 300, 500 315, 500  315, 500 330.75, 500
β4γ2 600  525 630  600 611.25 750 630 450, 750 450, 750  472.5, 750 472.5, 750
α2α4  210 315 220.5 227.5  227.5 350 262 100, 350 105, 350  105, 350 110.25, 350
α4α2  450 315 472.5 337.5 341.25 500 375 150, 500 150, 500  157.5, 500 157.5, 500
 
Table IV. Numbers of Games in which Types' Guesses are Separated by More than 0, 25
  L1 L2 L3 D1 D2 Eq.  Soph.
L1  - 15, 13  15, 12 12, 10 15, 12 15, 15  15, 14
L2  15, 13  -  11, 91 3 , 91 0 , 81 1 , 9  10, 8
L3  15, 12  11, 9  - 13, 12 8, 59 , 6  9, 8
D1  12, 10  13, 9  13, 12 - 9, 71 4 , 13  12, 10
D2  15, 12  10, 8  8, 59 , 7-9 , 8  9, 6
Eq.  15, 15  11, 9  9, 61 4 , 13 9, 8 -  11, 9
Soph.  15, 14  10, 8  9, 81 2 , 10 9, 61 1 , 9  -
  40Table V. Strength of Baseline and OB Subjects' Incentives to Make Types' Guesses
  L0  L1 L2 R1 R2  Eq. B+OB
L1  34.95 (100) 28.41  (55) 36.81 (76) 34.38 (83) 33.61 (78) 25.98  (56) 34.63 (8
L2  31.20 (89) 51.81  (100) 31.34 (65) 39.30 (94) 38.68 (90) 31.37  (68) 38.73 (9
L3  32.99 (94) 35.01  (68) 48.14 (100) 38.70 (93) 41.14 (95) 34.00  (74) 39.34 (9
D1  33.73 (97) 41.13  (79) 37.56 (78) 41.64 (100) 41.11 (95) 29.42  (64) 39.50 (9
D2  32.86 (94) 41.56  (80) 40.57 (84) 40.79 (98) 43.13 (100) 32.43  (70) 40.07 (9
Eq.  30.14 (86)  36.67 (71) 36.09 (75) 35.87 (86) 38.30 (89) 46.05  (100) 35.98 (8
Soph.  33.04 (95)  41.38 (80) 41.24 (86) 40.77 (98) 41.84 (97) 31.67  (69) 40.53 (1
Note: The entries are in US dollars, expressed as percentages of the column maximum in parentheses. 
 
Table VI: Types' Ideal Guesses and Relevant Look-ups 
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Table VII. R/TS subjects' compliance with assigned type's guesses 
  L1 L2 L3 D1 D2 Eq. 
UCSD subjects  7 9 - 11 - 10 
% Compliance  77.7 81.3 -  55.1  -  58.1 
% Failed UT2  0.0 0.0  -  8.3  -  28.6 
            
York subjects  18 18 18 19 19  19 
% Compliance  80.9 95.8 84.4 66.1 55.6  76.6 
% Failed UT2  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 13.6 
            
UCSD + York subjects  25 27 18 30 19  29 
% Compliance  80.0 91.0 84.4 62.1 55.6  70.3 
% Failed UT2  0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 5.0 19.4 
 
  41Table VIII. B and OB Subjects' Aggregate Compliance with Iterated Dominance and Equilibrium Guesses 
Game Respects Respects Respects Respects Equilibrium Equilibrium
(#rounds)  0 rounds  1 round  2 rounds  3 rounds  within 0 or 0.5  within 25 
  B, OB, B+OB  B, OB, B+OB B, OB, B+OB B, OB, B+OB B, OB, B+OB B,OB, B+OB
All games  10,11,10 (39)  15,16,15 (20)  22,21,21 (7)  13,14,14 (8)  18,15,18 (0,0)  23,15,22 (3) 
α2β1 (4)  0,0,0 (0) 62,82,66 (81) 0 ,0,0 (0) 23,18,22 (19) 15,0,12 (0,0) 31,0,25 (0)
β1α2 (3)  21,24,22 (81) 0 ,0,0 (0) 62,65,63(19) 17,12,16 (0) 17,12,16 (0,0) 20,12,18 (2)
β1γ2 (3)  27,29,27 (88) 0 ,0,0 (0) 63,59,63(12) 10,11,10 (0) 10,12,10 (0,0) 28,24,27 (6)
γ2β1 (2)  0,0,0 (0) 55,59,56 (100) 45,41,44(0) 0,0,0 (0) 45,41,44 (0,0) 48,59,50 (0)
γ4δ3 (2)  18,24,19 (75) 14,0,11 (25) 68,77,69 (0) 0,0,0 (0) 68,76,69 (0,0) 72,76,73 (0)
δ3γ4 (3)  11,18,13 (57) 51,59,52 (32) 10,6,9 (11) 28,18,26 (0) 28,18,26 (0,0) 31,18,28 (8)
δ3δ3 (5)  4,0,3 (15) 4 ,12,6 (19) 23,12,21 (26) 42,53,44 (33) 25,18,24 (0,0) 27,24,26 (0)
δ3δ3 (5)  6,0,5 (15) 0 ,6,1 (19) 28,18,26 (26) 44,65,48 (33) 23,12,20 (0,0) 23,12,20 (0)
β1α4 (9)  31,24,30 (81) 0 ,0,0 (0) 37,35,36 (8) 0,0,0 (0) 6,0,5 (0,0) 6 ,12,7 (0)
α4β1 (10)  0,0,0 (12) 47,35,44 (32) 0 ,0,0 (0) 23,35,25 (23) 3,6,3 (0,0) 4 ,6,5 (13)
δ2β3 (17)  14,12,14 (45) 0 ,0,0 (0) 4 ,12,6 (9) 0,0,0 (0) 6,0,5 (0,0) 6 ,0,5 (0)
β3δ2 (18)  6,6,3 (36) 0 ,6,5 (10) 28,0,0 (0) 44,18,23 (10) 1,0,1 (0,0) 7 ,0,6 (6)
γ2β4 (22)  0,0,0 (0) 4 ,0,3 (7) 0 ,0,0 (0) 3,0,2 (8) 18,29,20 (0,0) 23,29,24 (0)
β4γ2 (23)  11,18,13 (62) 0 ,0,0 (0) 4 ,0,3 (3) 0,0,0 (0) 8,6,8 (0,0) 10,6,9 (6)
α2α4 (52)  9,18,10 (38) 0 ,0,0 (1) 0 ,0,0 (0) 0,0,0 (1) 13,6,11 (0,0) 20,6,17 (13)
α4α2 (51)  3,0,2 (12) 0 ,0,0 (0) 3 ,6,3 (2) 0,0,0 (0) 7,0,6 (0,0) 8 ,0,7 (0)
Note: The table gives compliance percentages rounded to the nearest integer, with random compliance percentages in parentheses. 
 
  42Table IX. Type Estimates Based on Guesses Only, Search Only, and Guesses and  Search
              Guesses only                    Search only Guesses and search
ID    dom. ln  L  k  exac λ  ln L  ks ζH ζM ln Lt ln Lg ln Ls ks exa λ  ζH ζM
513          -- -- --- -- - 0 0.00 L1
  16 - - - 
118                              0 -9.62 L1  15 1.85 -7.41 L1e 0.88 0.06 -17.03 -9.62 -7.41 L1e 15 1.85 0.88 0.06
101                              1 -10.27 L1  15 0.55 -9.94 L1e
‡ 0.69 0.31 -20.21 -10.27 -9.94 L1e‡‡ 15 0.55 0.69 0.31
104                          0 -16.63 L1  14 2.20
* -3.74  L1e 0.00 0.94 -20.37 -16.63 -3.74 L1e 14 2.20 0.00 0.94
413                              0 -17.81 L1  14 0.88 -6.03 L1l 0.13 0.88 -23.84 -17.81 -6.03 L1l 14 0.88 0.13 0.88
207                              0 -17.96 L1  14 0.42 0.00 L1e 1.00 0.00 -17.96 -17.96 0.00 L1e   14 0.42 1.00 0.00
216                              1 -25.41 L1  13 1.06 -11.25 L3e 0.75 0.19 -38.69 -25.41 -13.29 L1e 13 1.06 0.31 0.63
402                        0 -30.93 L1  12 5.65
* -9.00  L1e 0.00 0.75 -39.93 -30.93 -9.00  L1e 12 5.65 0.00 0.75
418                          0 -42.23 L1  10 21.22
** -7.41  L2e 0.88 0.06 -52.16 -42.23 -9.94 L1e 10 21.22 0.00 0.69
301                              1 -45.84 L1
D 10 0.00 -3.74 L1e 0.06 0.94 -49.58 -45.84 -3.74 L1e
D 10 0.00 0.06 0.94
508                            0 -46.19 L1
D 10 2.05 - - - - - - -  -  - - - - 
308                              3 -47.34 L1  10 0.00 -9.63 L3e 0.81 0.13 -60.65 -47.34 -13.30 L1el 10 0.00 0.19 0.69
102                            4 -47.63 L1  10 0.00 -9.63 L2e 0.81 0.06 -57.57 -47.63 -9.94  L1e 10 0.00 0.00 0.69
415                            1 -53.64 L1  9 0.88 -16.38  D1e 0.31 0.50 -107.28 -90.90 -16.38 D1e
+ 2 0.76 0.31 0.50
504                            1 -56.97 L1  8 1.68
** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
208                              6 -61.62 L1  8 0.00 -3.74 L1l 0.06 0.94 -65.37 -61.62 -3.74 L1l 8 0.00 0.06 0.94
318                          0 -62.61 L1  7 3.18
* -3.74  L1e
‡ 0.00 0.94 -66.36 -62.61 -3.74 L1e 7 3.18 0.00 0.94
512                                0 -63.33 L1  7 1.56 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
502                                1 -64.55 L1  7 1.01 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
516                              1 -64.93 L1
C 7 1.10
* - - - - - - - - - - - - 
409                          0 -73.59 L1
E 4 9.90
** -10.59  L1l 0.00 0.38 -84.18 -73.59 -10.59 L1l
 E 4 9.90 0.00 0.38
106                            0 -75.82 L1  5 1.19 -7.72 Eqe 0.00 0.19 -85.75 -75.82 -9.94  L1l 5 1.19 0.00 0.31
305                              3 -79.89 L1  5 0.37 -6.03 L1e 0.88 0.13 -85.92 -79.89 -6.03 L1e 5 0.37 0.88 0.13
411                          1 -80.58 L1  4 1.45
** 0.00  L3e 1.00 0.00 -86.61 -80.58 -6.03 L1e 4 1.45 0.13 0.88
509                                1 -81.81 L1  4 0.86 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
203                              4 -83.90 L1  4 0.00 -9.94 Eqe 0.00 0.31 -94.49 -83.90 -10.59 L1e 4 0.00 0.00 0.63
505                                4 -84.13 L1  4 0.43 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
317                          3 -86.58 L1  3 0.92
* -3.74  L1e 0.94 0.06 -90.32 -86.58 -3.74 L1e 3 0.92 0.94 0.06
416                          1 -86.74 L1
† 1 4.48
** -3.74  L1e
‡ 0.00 0.94 -90.48 -86.74 -3.74 L1e 1 4.48 0.00 0.94
217                            3 -87.12 L1  3 0.68 -10.59  L1e 0.00 0.38 -97.71 -87.12 -10.59 L1e 3 0.68 0.00 0.38
  43219                          3 -87.32 L1
+ 3 0.89
* -7.72  L1e 0.00 0.81 -95.04 -87.32 -7.72 L1e
+ 3 0.89 0.00 0.81
501                              1 -87.93 L1
† 0 4.38
** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
410                          3 -89.18 L1  2 1.53
** -7.72  L1el
‡ 0.00 0.19 -96.90 -89.18 -7.72 L1el 2 1.53 0.00 0.19
510                                5 -89.60 L1  3 0.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
420                          2 -89.68 L1
+ 2 1.25
** -3.74  Eql 0.00 0.06 -94.26 -90.52 -3.74 Eql
+ 3 0.19 0.00 0.06
408                          2 -89.71 L1
+ 2 1.09
* -6.03  L1e 0.00 0.88 -95.74 -89.71 -6.03 L1e
+ 2 1.09 0.00 0.88
201                          3 -90.26 L1
+ 2 1.21
** -3.74  L1e
‡ 0.00 0.94 -94.00 -90.26 -3.74 L1e
+ 2 1.21 0.00 0.94
105                          2 -90.58 L1
+ 2 1.29
** -9.00  Eqe 0.25 0.75 -102.56 -93.56 -9.00 Eqe
+ 2 0.11 0.25 0.75
103                        3 -90.61 L1
+ 2 1.12
* -6.03  L1e 0.00 0.13 -96.63  -90.61 -6.03 L1e
+ 2 1.12 0.00 0.13
213                          2 -95.57 L1
†+ 0 1.19
* -3.74  L2e 0.94 0.00 -100.34 -96.60 -3.74 L2e
+ 0 0.62 0.94 0.00
515                                4 -95.68 L1
†+ 1 0.60 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
113                          5 -96.61 L1
†+ 1 0.07 -9.63  L3el
‡ 0.81 0.06 -108.49 -98.86 -9.63 L3el
+ 4 0 0.81  0.06
109                                8 -97.31 L1
†+ 1 0.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
309                            0 0.00 L2  16 - -9.94  L2el
‡ 0.69 0.00 -9.94 0.00 -9.94 L2el 16 0.00 0.69 0.00
405                            0 0.00 L2  16 - -13.30  L3e 0.69 0.13 -14.40 0.00 -14.40 L2e 16 0.00 0.63 0.25
206                            0 -10.07 L2  15 0.79 -7.41 L2e 0.88 0.06 -17.49 -10.07 -7.41  L2e 15 0.79 0.88 0.06
209                              0 -25.51 L2  13 0.96 -9.00 L1e 0.00 0.75 -35.45 -25.51 -9.94 L2l 13 0.96 0.69 0.31
108                          0 -25.88 L2  13 0.45
* 0.00  L2e
‡ 1.00 0.00 -25.88 -25.88 0.00 L2e 13 0.45 1.00 0.00
214                          2 -35.30 L2  11 2.73
** -3.74  L1e 0.00 0.94 -41.33 -35.30 -6.03 L2e 11 2.73 0.88 0.13
307                          1 -38.88 L2  11 1.04
* -7.72  Eqe 0.00 0.19 -48.51 -38.88 -9.63 L2l 11 1.04 0.81 0.13
218                              0 -40.54 L2  11 0.60 -7.72 L1e 0.00 0.81 -53.84 -40.54 -13.30 L2l 11 0.60 0.69 0.19
422                            2 -55.79 L2  9 0.22 0.00 L1e 0.00 1.00 -61.82 -55.79 -6.03  L2e 9 0.22 0.88 0.13
316                            1 -58.43 L2  8 0.73 -10.97  Eqe
‡ 0.00 0.44 -72.26 -58.43 -13.84 L2l 8 0.73 0.06 0.38
407                          0 -60.98 L2
C 8 0.44 -6.03  L2e
‡ 0.88 0.13 -67.00 -60.98 -6.03  L2e
C 8 0.44 0.88 0.13
306                            2 -68.48 L2  7 0.18 -3.74  L1l 0.00 0.06 -75.68 -71.94 -3.74 L1l 6 0.71 0.00 0.06
412                          0 -69.43 L2  6 1.05
** 0.00  L2e
‡ 1.00 0.00 -69.43 -69.43 0.00 L2e 6 1.05 1.00 0.00
205                              0 -72.81 L2  6 0.01 0.00 L1e 0.00 1.00 -75.80 -75.80 0.00 L1e 4 3.27 0.00 1.00
220                              1 -72.96 L2  6 0.32 0.00 L1e 0.00 1.00 -76.70 -72.96 -3.74 L2e 6 0.32 0.94 0.06
403                            0 -73.60 L2  6 0.50 -6.03  Eql
‡ 0.00 0.13 -86.91 -80.88 -6.03 Eql
+ 4 0.84 0.00 0.13
517                              0 -73.70 L2  5 0.98
** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
503                                3 -88.21 L2
+ 3 0.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
414                          4 -89.00 L2  2 0.78
* -7.72  L1e 0.00 0.19 -102.56 -92.62 -9.94 Eqe
+ 2 0.36 0.00 0.31
110                              3 -92.51 L2
+ 2 0.00 -9.00 L1l 0.00 0.75 -107.03 -98.03 -9.00 L1l
+ 0 0.56 0.00 0.75
  44210                          0 -51.13 L3
B 9 0.92
* -10.59  L1e 0.00 0.38 -68.44 -51.13 -17.32 L3e
B 9 0.92 0.38 0.25
302                        0 -61.46 L3
B 7 1.11
** -6.03  Eqe 0.00 0.13 -71.14  -65.12 -6.03 Eqe
B 7 1.11 0.00 0.13
507                              0 -63.23 L3  7 0.94
** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
313                          0 -79.12 D1
E 2 2.68
** -6.03  L1e
‡ 0.00 0.88 -90.93 -84.90 -6.03 L1e‡‡
E 2 3.28 0.00 0.88
312                          0 -80.45 D1
† 3 5.85
** -3.74  L2e
‡ 0.94 0.06 -84.74 -81.00 -3.74 L2e 3 1.37 0.94 0.06
204                  2        2 -84.86 D1
E 2 1.22
** 0.00  L1e
‡ 0.00 1.00 -88.47 -88.47 0.00 L1e
+E 1.59 0.00 1.00
115                          1 -86.10 D1  2 1.74
** -9.94  Eqe 0.00 0.31 -107.99 -98.05 -9.94 Eqe
+ 0 0.39 0.00 0.31
401                          2 -91.99 D1
†+ 0 1.58
** -6.03  Eql 0.00 0.13 -104.35 -98.32 -6.03 Eql
+ 0 0.32 0.00 0.13
310                            0 -41.69 Eq  11 0.00 -9.94 L1l 0.00 0.31 -56.84  -41.69 -15.15 Eqel 11 0.00 0.13 0.31
315                            0 -41.80 Eq  11 0.00 0.00 L3e
‡ 1.00 0.00 -50.80 -41.80 -9.00  Eqe 11 0.00 0.00 0.75
404                            1 -54.69 Eq  9 0.03 -9.00  Eqe
‡ 0.00 0.75 -63.69 -54.69 -9.00 Eqe 9 0.03 0.00 0.75
303                            0 -59.93 Eq  8 0.41 -3.74  Eqe
‡ 0.00 0.06 -63.68 -59.93 -3.74 Eqe 8 0.41 0.00 0.06
417                            0 -60.52 Eq
A 8 0.30 -10.97  L1e 0.00 0.44 -73.80 -60.52 -13.29 Eqe
A 8 0.30 0.31 0.63
202                            0 -60.78 Eq
A 8 0.10 -9.94 Eqe 0.00 0.31 -70.72 -60.78 -9.94  Eqe
A 8 0.10 0.00 0.31
518                                0 -66.38 Eq  7 0.61 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
112                          2 -66.39 Eq  7 0.00 -16.64  L2e 0.25 0.25 -106.23 -89.60 -16.64 L2e
+ 3 0 0.25  0.25
215                          0 -73.85 Eq  6 0.55 -3.74 L1e 0.00 0.06 -81.57  -73.85 -7.72  Eqe 6 0.55 0.00 0.19
314                              5 -78.06 Eq  5 0.52 -9.94 Eqe 0.00 0.69 -87.99 -78.06 -9.94 Eqe 5 0.52 0.00 0.69
211                              3 -79.14 Eq  5 0.00 -7.72 Eqe 0.00 0.19 -86.86 -79.14 -7.72 Eqe 5 0.00 0.00 0.19
514                                8 -85.98 Eq  2 0.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
406                              2 -86.73 Eq  3 0.59 -6.03 L1l 0.00 0.13 -99.17 -86.73 -12.44 Eql 3 0.59 0.06 0.25
212                            5 -96.62 Eq
†+ 1 0.00 -6.03 L1e 0.00 0.88 -104.34 -96.62 -7.72  Eqe
+ 1 0.00 0.00 0.81
506                              0 -82.10 So  3 1.26
** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
304                            5 -93.29 So
+ 2 0.25 0.00 Eqe 0.00 1.00 -97.31 -97.31 0.00 Eqe
+ 1 0 0.00  1.00
421                            4 -96.78 So
† 1 0.31 -10.59  Eqe 0.00 0.38 -109.34 -98.38 -10.97 L1e
+ 0 0.43 0.00 0.56
Notes: A guesses-only or guesses-and-search type identifier superscripted † means the subject's estimated type was not significantly better than a random model of guesses (λ = 0, ε ≈ 1) at 
the 5% (or 1%) level. A guesses-only or guesses-and-search type identifier superscripted + means the estimated type had lower likelihood than 12 or more pseudotypes, more than expected 
at random. A guesses-only or guesses-and-search type identifier superscripted A, B, C, D, or E indicates membership in a cluster. A guesses-only or guesses-and-search type identifier in 
bold appears or is reliable, by the criteria stated in the text. An estimated λ superscripted ** (*) means that λ = 0 is rejected at the 1% (5%) level. ln Lt, ln Lg, and ln Ls refer to total, 
guesses-only, and search-only likelihoods. A type-style identifier subscripted el indicates that both styles have equal likelihoods and equal ζc. A search-only type-style identifier subscripted 
‡ indicates that there are alternatives with different types and/or ζ : L1 c l  for subjects 101 and 404; L2e and L3  for 318 and 204, L3 e e for 416 and 201; L1e and L3el for 309; L1e  and L3e for 
108; L1  for 316, 407, 403, and 315;  L1 , L3 , and Eq  for 412 and 312;  L1 e e e e l, D2 , and So  for 313; and D1 e e e for 303. A guesses-and-search type-style identifier subscripted ‡‡ indicates that 
there are alternatives with different ζ : L1 c l  for subjects 101 and 313. No search estimates are reported for subject 109, who had 0 search compliance in 8 or more games for every type. 
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